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CALLING THEM AS HE SEES THEM: THE DISAPPEARANCE OF 
ORIGINALISM IN JUSTICE THOMAS’S OPINIONS ON RACE 
JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN* 
ABSTRACT 
 During his first two decades on the Court, Justice Clarence 
Thomas has been associated with originalism and is often viewed 
as its leading judicial proponent.  Justice Thomas has linked 
originalism with the effort to limit judicial discretion and to pro-
mote judicial impartiality.  In cases dealing with many constitu-
tional provisions, Justice Thomas has shown his commitment to 
originalism by often writing solitary concurrences and dissents 
advocating an originalist analysis of a problem.  Yet in constitu-
tional cases dealing with race, Justice Thomas routinely aban-
dons originalism and embraces the sort of constitutional argu-
ments based on morality or consequentialism that he often 
discounts.  These opinions in race cases are often powerful and 
impassioned, just not originalist.  Justice Thomas’s behavior in 
these race cases indicates that he is less committed to originalism 
than often suggested or than he claims.  In these cases, he has of-
ten provided a distinctive, and personal, perspective to the Court.  
In doing so, however, he departs from the originalism that he has 
otherwise advocated as the route to judicial impartiality. 
INTRODUCTION 
During his first two decades on the Supreme Court, Justice Clarence 
Thomas has established himself as its most outspoken originalist.  In nu-
merous opinions and nonjudicial utterances, Justice Thomas has propound-
ed an approach to interpreting the Constitution which insists that its text be 
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construed in accordance with some version of originalism.  Originalism, ac-
cording to Justice Thomas, is the legitimate way to understand the Constitu-
tion, the secret to protecting judicial impartiality, and the elixir to prevent-
ing judges from imposing their values on constitutional decisionmaking. 
The commitment to originalism that is so conspicuous in so many of 
Justice Thomas’s constitutional opinions is less evident when he writes 
about race.  In those cases, he makes few, if any, references to 1789 (or 
1791) or 1868 to find constitutional meaning.  Instead, time and again he 
interprets the relevant constitutional language by emphasizing other aids, 
including the sort of moral, consequentialist, and policy-oriented arguments 
that trigger his criticism—even outrage—in other contexts.  And he reaches 
results that seem inconsistent with where originalism would lead. 
The divergence in Justice Thomas’s approach in constitutional cases 
dealing with race is perceptible and recurring.  It has characterized his judi-
cial behavior from the beginning of his tenure on the Court and has contin-
ued through the Court’s most recent terms.  For instance, in Fisher v. Uni-
versity of Texas at Austin,1 he again wrote a concurring opinion in a 
constitutional case dealing with race but justified his conclusions on moral 
and consequential, not originalist, arguments. 
The disappearance of originalism from this body of Justice Thomas’s 
opinions is noteworthy in view of his intense interest in, and strong beliefs 
and feelings about, constitutional, historical, and policy issues relating to 
race.  Such issues are clearly not matters of indifference to Justice Thomas.  
Far from it.  He writes about these topics frequently when they come before 
the Court and sometimes introduces considerations based on race in cases 
ostensibly about something else.  His opinions in these cases are passionate.  
One might expect Justice Thomas to deploy originalism, the constitutional 
theory he champions, to interpret the Constitution on issues that engage him 
so deeply.  He does not.  In fact, the converse is true.  Race cases are one of 
the rare constitutional issues where his reliance on originalism largely van-
ishes. 
Justice Thomas has not explained or even acknowledged the absence 
of an originalist presentation from his jurisprudence in constitutional cases 
dealing with race, and this silence is equally conspicuous.  Although Justice 
Thomas has participated in discussions of correct and incorrect modes of 
constitutional interpretation and has written and spoken about constitutional 
interpretation since joining the Court, he has not offered any published jus-
tification of why his judicial methodology in race cases differs so markedly 
from his practice in many other areas of constitutional law. 
                                                          
 1.  133 S. Ct. 2411, 2428–32 (2013) (arguing that the “racial tinkering” of universities 
through affirmative action policies does more to harm than to help minorities). 
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It cannot be said that Justice Thomas’s failure to use originalism as his 
interpretive compass in race cases is surprising in view of the consistency in 
that particular omission during the more than two decades he has served on 
the Court.  But predictability of the pattern does not make it any less anom-
alous. 
The disappearance of originalism in race cases raises questions regard-
ing Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence.  It might suggest that he is a less faith-
ful originalist than he has professed or that he sometimes uses originalism 
to reach desired results but abandons that methodology when it will not 
generate a congenial outcome.  In a sense, neither conclusion would neces-
sarily separate Justice Thomas from many other jurists who treat original-
ism as one of a number of valid types of constitutional argument.  Yet two 
factors distinguish Justice Thomas’s behavior in this regard.  First, those 
other jurists subscribe to more pluralistic theories of constitutional adjudica-
tion.  Unlike Justice Thomas, they do not claim that originalism is the only 
valid path, and accordingly, their departures from it do not deviate from the 
interpretive theories they espouse.  Second, Justice Thomas’s failure even 
to acknowledge the discrepancy between his professed theory and his per-
formance in constitutional cases dealing with race suggests either that he is 
oblivious to the pattern or does not believe himself compelled to explain it. 
Justice Thomas’s tendency to jettison originalism in race cases also 
raises questions about originalism.  It might suggest that the methodology 
of originalism simply cannot produce the outcomes in race cases some of its 
proponents have claimed, both in justifying the results in Brown v. Board of 
Education2 and Bolling v. Sharpe3 and in supporting opposition to race con-
scious decisionmaking in affirmative action cases.  My purpose here is not 
to investigate the merits of that question.  Justice Thomas’s behavior itself 
cannot prove that originalism is deficient in this regard, but the failure of 
such a prominent and admired originalist to use that interpretive technique 
in race cases is curious to say the least. 
Although Justice Thomas does generally prefer some brand of 
originalism, his behavior in constitutional cases dealing with race suggests 
that such an orientation is not his ultimate jurisprudential commitment.  If it 
were, he would either draw from originalism extensively in writing on those 
cases, as he often does elsewhere, or perhaps he would explain why the 
originalist tools he uses in other contexts are not useful interpretive instru-
ments in race cases.  Instead, his opinions in race cases appear to draw 
heavily from his deeply held beliefs and feelings about racial justice in-
                                                          
 2.  347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that racial segregation in public education violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 3.  347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (holding that racial segregation in public schools in the District 
of Columbia violated the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause). 
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formed by his own experience.  Yet just as conflicts emerge between his 
professed methodology of originalism and his handling of constitutional 
cases involving race, so too, do inconsistencies emerge in his handling of 
high profile race cases.  Ultimately, in race cases, whatever value Justice 
Thomas brings to the Court comes not because he adheres to a rigorous or 
consistent form of adjudication—he doesn’t—but because he speaks pas-
sionately based on a distinctive set of experiences and values.  Far from be-
ing the impartial jurist Justice Thomas has celebrated as the model and with 
which he has associated originalism, Justice Thomas’s discussions of race 
draw heavily from lessons in his own life. 
This Article begins by discussing Justice Thomas’s stated aspiration to 
be an originalist justice and describes his performance generally in this re-
spect.  Part II shows how he abandons originalism in constitutional cases 
dealing with race.  Part III discusses in more depth his opinions in cases 
discussing race issues to show his engagement in that area.  Part IV draws 
conclusions. 
I.  ORIGINALISM AND JUSTICE THOMAS 
A.  Justice Thomas’s Case for Originalism 
Since joining the Court, Justice Thomas has pronounced impartiality 
as “the very essence of judging and of being a judge.”4  This vision in-
formed his comments during his confirmation proceedings, where he ex-
pounded an uncompromising view of judicial neutrality.  In nominating 
him, President George H.W. Bush had said that he told Judge Thomas “that 
he ought to do like the umpire: Call them as you see them.”5  At his confir-
mation hearings, Judge Thomas declared that a judge had to “become ac-
customed to not having views, formed views on issues that may come be-
fore him or her.  You become impartial or neutral.”6  Whether interpreting a 
statute or the Constitution, Judge Thomas said, the judicial role was limited; 
and the judge’s role was “at no point to impose his or her will or his or her 
opinion in that process, but, rather, to go to the traditional tools of constitu-
tional interpretation or adjudication, as well as to statutory construction, but 
not, again, to impose his or her own point of view or his or her predilections 
                                                          
 4.  Clarence Thomas, Judging, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 4 (1996).  See also CLARENCE 
THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHER’S SON: A MEMOIR 238 (2007) (discussing the process that an im-
partial judge follows in each case in order to determine his or her ultimate ruling). 
 5.  The President’s News Conference in Kennebunkport, Maine, 1991 PUB. PAPERS 801, 805 
(July 1, 1991). 
 6.  Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of 
the United States: Hearings on Nomination of Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of the Su-
preme Court of the United States Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 102d. Cong., Pt. 
1, 134 (1991) [hereinafter, Thomas Hearings]. 
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or preconceptions.”7  A judge should not be an activist or have an agenda8 
or “strong ideology” or “ideological views” but should “strip down, like a 
runner” to relieve himself from such baggage.9 
In his opinions while on the Court and in his extrajudicial writings, 
Justice Thomas has embraced originalism as the way to advance judicial 
impartiality and to protect judicial opinions from reflecting the personal bi-
ases of particular jurists.10  Justice Thomas provided his most developed 
published statement of some of his ideas in a 1996 speech on “Judging” at 
the University of Kansas School of Law.  There he celebrated the im-
portance of impartiality in judging, prescribed limiting judicial discretion as 
a means to promote impartiality, and offered originalism as a methodology 
to limit judicial discretion.  Justice Thomas vigorously rejected the notion 
that judges make law.11  Instead, judges are to be “impartial referees.”12  In 
fact, a jurist “must attempt to exorcise himself or herself of the passions, 
thoughts, and emotions that fill any frail human being.  He must become 
almost pure” in order to perform the judicial function.13  In order to render a 
fair judgment, a judge must “push to one side” identifying characteristics 
such as race or sex.14  Just as a black referee would not be expected to favor 
black participants in calling a sporting event, a black judge cannot favor the 
“perceived interests” of black litigants.15  A jurist, especially a justice, must 
                                                          
 7.  Id. at 135; see also id. at 137 (stating that a judge’s personal views should not play a role 
and that a judge should consider recusal if he or she is unable to be “impartial or objective”); id. at 
180 (discussing the need for a judge to be impartial and to be perceived as such); id. at 183 (stat-
ing that judges must shed personal opinions and not express strong opinions to preserve impar-
tiality); id. at 334 (stating that a judge should not read views into the Constitution). 
 8.  Id. at 172. 
 9.  Id. at 203; see also id. at 267 (claiming that a judge strives for “impartiality” and “strip[s] 
down from . . . policy positions”). 
 10.  See, e.g., Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469, 523 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(“When faced with a clash of constitutional principle and a line of unreasoned cases wholly di-
vorced from the text, history, and structure of our founding document, we should not hesitate to 
resolve the tension in favor of the Constitution’s original meaning.”); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 
343, 367 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring) (declaring “[s]trict adherence” to text and tradition “is 
essential if we are to fulfill our constitutionally assigned role of giving full effect to the mandate 
of the Framers without infusing the constitutional fabric with our own political views.”); see also 
Thomas, supra note 4, at 4–8 (celebrating importance of judicial impartiality and recommending 
originalism as a means to limit judicial discretion and promote impartiality); A Conversation with 
Justice Clarence Thomas, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 7, 20 (2009) (“It’s what I’m trying to find from the 
people who were there, or who were close to that . . . .  Is it perfect?  No it’s not.  And some peo-
ple like to call it originalism.  But it keeps me from putting my personal views on it.”). 
 11.  Thomas, supra note 4, at 2–5. 
 12.  Id. at 4. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. at 5. 
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adopt an adjudicatory methodology which will minimize judicial discretion 
and promote judicial restraint.16 
Justice Thomas offered originalism as the methodology central to his 
vision of judging.  According to Justice Thomas, judges cannot use ambig-
uous constitutional language to justify imposing “our modern theories and 
preconceptions upon the Constitution.”17  Instead, in constitutional cases 
courts should search for the “original understanding” of constitutional lan-
guage, the meaning of which is not clear.18  Moreover, under originalism 
the Constitution means what it was understood to mean by the delegates at 
the Philadelphia and the ratifying conventions.19  Justice Thomas also justi-
fied originalism as implied by the written nature of the Constitution.20  The 
decision to adopt a written Constitution rejected a vision of one whose 
meaning evolved or changed. 
Five years after his Kansas lecture, Justice Thomas sounded very simi-
lar themes in his Francis Boyer Lecture to the American Enterprise Insti-
tute.  Judges must be “impartial referees,” he proclaimed.21  They must push 
to the side their race, gender, and religion and “must attempt to keep at bay 
those passions, interests, and emotions that beset every frail human be-
ing.”22  Although the Constitution was written “in broad, sometimes ambig-
uous terms,” it lent itself to “correct” answers which could be discovered if 
judges adopted “principles of interpretation and methods of analysis that 
reduce judicial discretion.”23  He said constitutional interpretation “should 
seek the original understanding” if the text’s meaning is not clear.24  Consti-
tutional meaning was determined by “the understanding” of the drafters and 
ratifiers.25 
More recently, in a lecture to the Manhattan Institute, Justice Thomas 
again invoked originalism as a means to preserve judicial impartiality.  He 
declared that constitutional interpreters could either try to discern the Fram-
ers’ intent “or make it up”26 and that interpretive methods that are not based 
on the Framers’ original intent “have no more basis in the Constitution than 
                                                          
 16.  Id. at 6. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. at 7. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Clarence Thomas, Be Not Afraid, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE (Feb. 13, 2001), 
http://www.aei.org/publication/be-not-afraid/. 
 22.  Id.  
 23.  Id.  
 24.  Id.  
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Clarence Thomas, How to Read the Constitution, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 20, 2008), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122445985683948619.html (reprinting excerpts from Justice 
Thomas’s Wriston Lecture to the Manhattan Institute). 
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the latest football scores.”27  Justice Thomas conceded that although even 
conscientious efforts to apply the Framers’ original intent were flawed, 
originalism at least was “legitimate” and “impartial.”28 
B.  Justice Thomas as Constitutional Originalist 
Justice Thomas’s judicial performance has also evidenced a commit-
ment to some form of originalism in interpreting the Constitution.  To be 
sure, only a fraction of the opinions Justice Thomas writes address constitu-
tional matters.  He writes relatively few majority opinions in constitutional 
cases29 and, when he does, he often relies heavily on judicial precedent ra-
ther than on originalist reasoning,30 an unsurprising course in view of the 
institutional responsibility to write for a group most of whose members do 
not share his professed commitment to originalism. 
Concurrences and dissents afford a justice a better opportunity to es-
tablish and express an independent judicial voice, and Justice Thomas has 
made frequent use of such discretionary opinions in constitutional cases to 
take issue with non-originalist methodologies and to celebrate originalism 
and apply arguments associated with it.  In an early opinion, he suggested 
that recourse to “‘evolving standards of decency,’” a tool of living constitu-
tionalists,31 was illegitimate because it transformed the role of the federal 
judiciary in an unintended way.32  On another occasion, he caricatured “the 
pervasive view that the Federal Constitution must address all ills in our so-
ciety.”33  A 1999 dissenting opinion called for overruling a decision which 
“constitutionalizes a policy choice that a majority of the Court found desir-
able at the time. . . . This sort of undertaking is not an exercise in constitu-
tional interpretation but an act of judicial willfulness that has no logical 
stopping point.”34  More recently, he chastised the majority for following its 
own sense of morality rather than original understanding in order to shape 
future societal consensus.35  Justice Thomas’s enthusiasm for originalism 
                                                          
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  See Mark A. Graber, Clarence Thomas and the Perils of Amateur History, in REHNQUIST 
JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE COURT DYNAMIC 73–74 (Earl M. Maltz ed., 2003). 
 30.  But see Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155 (2013) (relying in part on the 
original meaning of the Sixth Amendment in holding that a defendant has the right to a jury trial 
regarding any fact that increases the range of possible penalties). 
 31.  See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571–72, 579 (2003) (relying on evolving 
standards to strike down Texas law outlawing same sex sodomy). 
 32.  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 859–60 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 33.  Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 28 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 34.  Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 343 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 35.  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2482 (2012) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing for 
original understanding in construing Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of Eighth Amend-
ment); see also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 97, 101 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (rejecting 
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was such that in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission36 he found that 
even a long-standing (“a century of practice”) and widespread (“by almost 
all of the States”) practice37 must yield to originalism, even when Justice 
Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist thought the original meaning too ob-
scure to be recalled38 and when “[t]he historical record is not as complete or 
as full as I would desire.”39 
Justice Thomas’s confirmation testimony might have encouraged the 
expectation that such ongoing history and tradition of the sort he encoun-
tered in McIntyre would help shape constitutional meaning.  Although he 
had indicated that original intent was important,40 he signaled that it would 
not constitute a trump card in his manner of constitutional adjudication.  
Constitutional interpretation should understand “what our Founders be-
lieved” but also “our history and our tradition, not just what their beliefs 
were when they drafted the document.”41  In interpreting the word “liberty,” 
he said an “important point is what did the Framers think they were doing,” 
but that question presented only part of the inquiry since “[t]he world didn’t 
stop with the Framers.  The concept of liberty wasn’t self-defining at that 
point.”42  Accordingly “it is important . . . that you then look at the rest of 
the history and tradition of our country.”43 
Yet rather than joining Justice Stevens’s majority opinion striking 
down Ohio’s ban on distributing anonymous campaign literature, Justice 
Thomas wrote a thirteen page concurring opinion reaching the same result 
as the Court but based on his assessment of the “original understanding” of 
                                                          
right of Court to decide Eighth Amendment issues based on evolving or national consensus or 
moral conceptions). 
 36.  514 U.S. 334 (1995).  
 37.  Id. at 370 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 38.  Id. at 371–72 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 39.  Id. at 367 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 40.  Thomas Hearings, supra note 6, at 112; id. at 168 (referring to natural law as relevant in 
understanding the Framers’ views and values); id. at 170–71 (describing natural law as a way to 
understanding the Framers’ views, not as a theory of adjudication); id. at 179 (limiting the use of 
natural law to understanding what the Framers meant and were trying to do); id. at 189 (limiting 
the use of natural law to understanding the intent of the drafters of the Civil War Amendments); 
id. at 237–38 (discussing recourse to beliefs of the Founders to understand liberty and other con-
stitutional concepts); id. at 274, 275–77; id. at 303 (advocating looking at the Framers’ intent); id. 
at 342 (discussing the importance of looking at the Framers’ intent).  
 41.  Id. at 193. 
 42.  Id. at 269–70.  
 43.  Id. at 270; see also id. at 273 (“[H]ow do we determine how our country has advanced 
and grown . . . ?  It is an amorphous process at times, but it is an important process.”); id. at 274 
(arguing that meaning of liberty does not stop at time of framing of Constitution but “evolves with 
the country, it moves with our history and our tradition.”); id. (arguing that Framers used “liberty” 
because it was a “broad concept” that “evolves over time” and that in interpreting it courts have 
accordingly looked to the “ideals” and “values” “that we share as a culture” which have “evolved 
over time” in “that specific provision”). 
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the First Amendment.44  Justice Thomas rejected the majority’s reasoning 
“because it deviates from our settled approach to interpreting the Constitu-
tion and because it superimposes its modern theories concerning expression 
upon the constitutional text.”45  The longstanding practice of anonymous 
publication “should be irrelevant to our analysis, because it sheds no light 
on what the phrases ‘free speech’ or ‘free press’ meant to the people who 
drafted and ratified the First Amendment.”46  That “certain types of expres-
sion have ‘value’ today has little significance; what is important is whether 
the Framers in 1791 believed anonymous speech sufficiently valuable to 
deserve the protection of the Bill of Rights.”47 
Justice Thomas claimed, “When interpreting other provisions of the 
Constitution, this Court has believed itself bound by the text of the Consti-
tution and by the intent of those who drafted and ratified it.”48  The same 
commitment to original meaning should govern the First Amendment “for 
‘[t]he Constitution is a written instrument.  As such its meaning does not 
alter.  That which it meant when adopted, it means now.’”49  Justice Thom-
as has reiterated this static approach to constitutional meaning on other oc-
casions.50 
As his McIntyre concurrence signaled, Justice Thomas has often writ-
ten discretionary opinions to apply some form of originalism in constitu-
tional cases.  One week after he issued his thirteen page McIntyre concur-
rence, he wrote a nineteen page concurrence to advocate use of original 
understanding to redefine the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence in 
United States v. Lopez.51  Although Justice Thomas joined the Court’s ma-
jority opinion that, for the first time in nearly sixty years, struck down an 
act of Congress as beyond its power under the Commerce Clause, he wrote 
separately to advocate a return to original understanding in future Com-
                                                          
 44.  McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 358–59 (rejecting the Court’s “methodology” focusing on the 
“honorable tradition” and “value” of anonymous speech to focus on whether original the under-
standing of “freedom of speech” included anonymous speech). 
 45.  Id. at 370. 
 46.  Id.  
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id.  
 49.  Id. at 359 (quoting South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905)). 
 50.  See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2751 (2011) (Thomas, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that as a written document, the Constitution’s meaning does not change); Utah v. 
Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 491 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“We 
should be guided, therefore, by the Census Clause’s original meaning, for [t]he Constitution is a 
written instrument.  As such its meaning does not alter.  That which it meant when adopted, it 
means now.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 351 
(2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the meaning of the 
Equal Protection Clause will not change in twenty-five years). 
 51.  514 U.S. 549, 584–602 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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merce Clause cases.52  Specifically, Justice Thomas argued that the majori-
ty’s “substantial effects” test was inconsistent with the text and history of 
the Constitution.  Justice Thomas indicated a preference for a jurisprudence 
based on original understanding53 but did not reject all roles for precedent54 
since others in the Lopez majority thought it “too late in the day to under-
take a fundamental reexamination of the past 60 years.”55  Justice Thomas’s 
emphasis on original understanding differed markedly not only from that of 
the other four dissenters but also from Justice Kennedy’s precedent-focused 
concurrence, which Justice O’Connor joined, and Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
majority opinion for five justices including Justice Thomas.  Significantly, 
no other justice joined Justice Thomas’s opinion. 
A decade later, Justice Thomas again advanced an originalist approach 
to the Commerce Clause in Gonzales v. Raich.56  He construed “commerce” 
in light of what that term meant “at the time of the founding” based on his 
reading of “founding-era dictionaries, Madison’s notes from the Constitu-
tional Convention, The Federalist Papers, and the ratification debates.”57  
He was interested in what “commerce” meant “not simply to those involved 
                                                          
 52.  Id. at 584 (“I write separately to observe that our case law has drifted far from the origi-
nal understanding of the Commerce Clause.  In a future case, we ought to temper our Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence in a manner that both makes sense of our more recent case law and is more 
faithful to the original understanding of that Clause.”). 
 53.  Id. at 601 n.8 (“Although I might be willing to return to the original understanding, I rec-
ognize that many believe that it is too late in the day to undertake a fundamental reexamination of 
the past 60 years.”); see also id. at 585 (“My goal is simply to show how far we have departed 
from the original understanding . . . .”); id. (“At the time the original Constitution was ratified, 
‘commerce’ consisted of selling, buying, and bartering, as well as transporting for these purpos-
es.”); id. at 586 (“In fact, when Federalists and Anti-Federalists discussed the Commerce Clause 
during the ratification period, they often used trade (in its selling/bartering sense) and commerce 
interchangeably.”); id. (“As one would expect, the term ‘commerce’ was used in contradistinction 
to productive activities such as manufacturing and agriculture.”); id. at 590 (“The exchanges dur-
ing the ratification campaign reveal the relatively limited reach of the Commerce Clause and of 
federal power generally.  The Founding Fathers confirmed that most areas of life (even many mat-
ters that would have substantial effects on commerce) would remain outside the reach of the Fed-
eral Government.  Such affairs would continue to be under the exclusive control of the States.”); 
id. at 590–91 (“Early Americans understood that commerce, manufacturing, and agriculture, while 
distinct activities, were intimately related and dependent on each other—that each ‘substantially 
affected’ the others . . . . Yet, despite being well aware that agriculture, manufacturing, and other 
matters substantially affected commerce, the founding generation did not cede authority over all 
these activities to Congress.”). 
 54.  See, e.g., id. at 585 (“In an appropriate case, I believe that we must further reconsider our 
‘substantial effects’ test with an eye toward constructing a standard that reflects the text and histo-
ry of the Commerce Clause without totally rejecting our more recent Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence.”); id. at 601 (“This extended discussion of the original understanding and our first century 
and a half of case law does not necessarily require a wholesale abandonment of our more recent 
opinions.”). 
 55.  Id. at 601 n.8. 
 56.  545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 57.  Id. at 58 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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in the drafting and ratification processes, but also to the general public.”58  
He has also used originalist methodologies to analyze a range of issues in 
other cases dealing with constitutional structure.59 
Justice Thomas does not use originalism only in cases interpreting the 
structural provisions of the Constitution.  He has frequently deployed 
originalism to interpret some of the Constitution’s open-ended language re-
garding individual rights.  In Morse v. Frederick,60 Justice Thomas joined 
Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion but wrote a concurrence to argue 
that the First Amendment was not originally understood to protect student 
speech in public schools.  Justice Thomas reached that conclusion based on 
the behavior of contemporary political actors.  “If students in public schools 
were originally understood as having free-speech rights, one would have 
expected 19th-century public schools to have respected those rights and 
courts to have enforced them.  They did not.”61 
Justice Thomas has gone out of his way to embrace various forms of 
originalism in other cases involving a range of rights, including interpreting 
the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause,62 the First Amendment’s Free 
                                                          
 58.  Id. at 59; id. at 70 (“The interconnectedness of economic activity is not a modern phe-
nomenon unfamiliar to the Framers.”); id. (“the Framers understood what the majority does not 
appear to fully appreciate”); see also American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles, 133 S. Ct. 
2096, 2105–06 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (concurring separately in unanimous opinion to 
argue that federal statute regulating intrastate commerce is unconstitutional); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. 
Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2677 (2012) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 59.  See, e.g., Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc. 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2263–64 (2013) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (invoking original intent to interpret the Voter Qualifications Clause of 
the Constitution); Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2567–70 (2013) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (using original understanding to argue that the Indian Commerce Clause does not al-
low Congress to regulate Indian child custody proceedings); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 
at 2677 (2012) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the “substantial effects” test is inconsistent 
with the original understanding of the Commerce Clause); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 580 
(2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (invoking the Framers’ intent regarding presidential power and 
national security); Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 432, 491 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (using originalism to interpret the Census Clause); Printz v. United States, 521 
U.S. 898, 937 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court’s Commerce Clause doc-
trine should return to original understanding); Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Har-
rison, 520 U.S. 564, 621–24 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (applying various forms of original-
ism to the Import-Export Clause); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 871–77 
(1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (using originalism to construe the Tenth Amendment and to derive 
basic principles of federalism). 
 60.  551 U.S. 393 (2007).  
 61.  Id. at 411 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also id. at 418–19 (“As originally understood, the 
Constitution does not afford students a right to free speech in public schools.”). 
 62.  Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692–93 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (calling for 
return to original meaning of “Establishment Clause”); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. 
of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 856–57 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Even if Madison believed 
that the principle of nonestablishment of religion precluded government financial support for reli-
gion per se (in the sense of government benefits specifically targeting religion), there is no indica-
tion that at the time of the framing he took the dissent’s extreme view that the government must 
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Speech Clause,63 the First Amendment’s Petition Clause,64 the Search and 
Seizure Clause of the Fourth Amendment,65 the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment,66 the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment,67 the 
Right to Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment,68 the Confrontation 
Clause of the Sixth Amendment,69 the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause of the Eighth Amendment,70 the Privileges or Immunities Clause of 
                                                          
discriminate against religious adherents by excluding them from more generally available finan-
cial subsidies.”); id. at 863 (“The dissent identifies no evidence that the Framers intended to disa-
ble religious entities from participating on neutral terms in evenhanded government programs.  
The evidence that does exist points in the opposite direction and provides ample support for to-
day’s decision.”). 
 63.  Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2752 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the original understanding of the Free Speech Clause does not authorize a party to 
speak to a minor without the permission of a parent); Morse, 551 U.S. at 411, 418–19 (Thomas J., 
concurring) (arguing that the original understanding of the First Amendment did not protect stu-
dent speech in public schools); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 358–59 (1995) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the First Amendment precludes a state from prohibiting the 
distribution of anonymous political materials). 
 64.  Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2501–02 (2011) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) (expressing doubt that lawsuits are within the Petition Clause under its original meaning). 
 65.  Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995) (applying the common law “knock and 
announce” requirement to police). 
 66.  Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 506 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“To-
day’s decision is simply the latest in a string of our cases construing the Public Use Clause to be a 
virtual nullity, without the slightest nod to its original meaning.  In my view, the Public Use 
Clause, originally understood, is a meaningful limit on the government’s eminent domain pow-
er.”); id. at 508 (“This would contradict a bedrock principle well established by the time of the 
founding: that all takings required the payment of compensation.”); id. at 508–09 (citing early dic-
tionaries and eminent domain practice to identify meaning of the term “use”); id. at 514 (criticiz-
ing Court for adopting “its modern reading blindly, with little discussion of the Clause’s history 
and original meaning”); id. at 521 (“I would revisit our Public Use Clause cases and consider re-
turning to the original meaning of the Public Use Clause . . . .”). 
 67.  Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2184 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the 
Fifth Amendment does not prohibit adverse comment on a criminal defendant’s pre-custodial si-
lence because at “founding, English and American courts strongly encouraged defendants to give 
unsworn statements and drew adverse inferences when they failed to do so”). 
 68.  Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 218 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 69.  See, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2260–64 (2012) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(arguing that original understanding limits the Confrontation Clause to formalized testimonial ma-
terials); Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1167 (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring) (advancing 
originalist argument to limit the scope of the Confrontation Clause); Davis v. Washington, 547 
U.S. 813, 835–36 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same). 
 70.  See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2484 (2012) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that mandatory life sentence without parole does not violate original understanding); Graham 
v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing for an application of original 
understanding in interpreting the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause); Baze v Rees, 553 U.S. 
35, 94–95, 97, 99, 107 (2008) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing contemporary dictionaries, Fram-
ers’ intent, and contemporary practice); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 859 (1994) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (using eighteenth-century dictionaries to define punishment as deriving from judicial 
sentence, not relating to conditions of confinement); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 38 
(1993); see id. at 38 (“At the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified, the word ‘punishment’ re-
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the Fourteenth Amendment,71 and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,72 and hints at it in other contexts.73 
In these cases, Justice Thomas does not simply give lip service to 
originalism.  On the contrary, he typically explores originalist underpin-
nings of issues at some length.  For instance, in Rothgery v. Gillespie Coun-
ty,74 Justice Thomas was the only dissenter in an 8-1 decision holding that 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached at the initial appearance of 
an arrested individual for a determination of probable cause and bail.  The 
Court’s decision was not supported, Justice Thomas wrote, by “the original 
meaning of the Sixth Amendment or any reasonable interpretation of our 
precedents.”75  Although Justice Thomas seemingly relied on precedent as 
well as originalism, the latter mode of argument clearly drove his analysis.  
The key question, Justice Thomas suggested, was what the constitutional 
phrase “criminal prosecutions” “meant when the Sixth Amendment was 
adopted” and what it “would have been understood to entail by those who 
adopted the Sixth Amendment.”76  Blackstone was the starting point for 
Justice Thomas’s analysis and the next six paragraphs of his dissent digest-
ed Blackstone’s usage, a discussion Justice Thomas reinforced by citing an 
early version of Noah Webster’s dictionary.  Justice Thomas cited nine-
teenth century cases consistent with his view that “criminal prosecutio[n]” 
as used in the Sixth Amendment “refers to the commencement of a criminal 
suit by filing formal charges in a court with jurisdiction to try and punish 
the defendant.”77  The “original meaning” of the Sixth Amendment accord-
ingly cut “decisively” against the Court’s conclusion.78 
                                                          
ferred to the penalty imposed for the commission of a crime . . . . Nor, as far as I know, is there 
any historical evidence indicating that the [F]ramers and ratifiers of the Eighth Amendment had 
anything other than this common understanding of ‘punishment’ in mind.”). 
 71.  Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 521 (1999) (“[T]he majority attributes a meaning to the Priv-
ileges or Immunities Clause that likely was unintended when the Fourteenth Amendment was en-
acted and ratified.”).  Justice Thomas said he “would look to history to ascertain the original 
meaning of the Clause.”  Id. at 522.  He stated that “I would be open to reevaluating its meaning in 
an appropriate case.  Before invoking the Clause, however, we should endeavor to understand 
what the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment thought that it meant.”  Id. at 528. 
 72.  Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2521 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
original understanding did not afford Due Process Clause right to appointed counsel for indigent 
defendant facing incarceration in civil contempt proceeding).  
 73.  See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80 (2000) (“I write separately to note that nei-
ther party has argued that our substantive due process cases were wrongly decided and that the 
original understanding of the Due Process Clause precludes judicial enforcement of unenumerated 
rights under that constitutional provision.”). 
 74.  554 U.S. 191 (2008). 
 75.  Id. at 218 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 76.  Id. at 219. 
 77.  Id. at 223. 
 78.  Id. at 224. 
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Several markers confirm the strength of Justice Thomas’s apparent 
commitment to originalism in many of these cases.  He has been willing to 
stake out an originalist position even when doing so leaves him filing a 
concurrence or dissent that no other justice joins, as he has on numerous 
occasions.79  Justice Thomas’s adherence to originalism is sufficiently zeal-
ous that at times he is willing to overturn precedents that others view as too 
entrenched to touch.  In Mitchell v. United States,80 for instance, Justice 
Thomas joined Justice Scalia’s dissent which resisted extending Griffin v. 
California,81 a Warren Court decision that precluded a judge or prosecutor 
from commenting about a defendant’s failure to testify in a criminal case.  
Whereas Justice Scalia, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice O’Connor 
characterized Griffin as “a wrong turn” based largely on its inconsistency 
with originalism,82 they concluded that was “not cause enough to overrule 
it.”83  Justice Thomas wrote a separate and solitary dissent to announce that 
he “would be willing to reconsider Griffin” in an appropriate case largely 
on originalist grounds.84  He has also argued for abandoning the Court’s 
Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, which has evolved over the last two 
centuries, and for replacing it with reliance on the Import-Export Clause 
based on originalist argument.85 
This willingness to stand alone in asserting originalist arguments and 
in overturning doctrine others accept has been an enduring characteristic of  
Justice Thomas’s service on the Court.  In 2007, he wrote a solitary concur-
rence86 to call on the Court to overturn Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District87 on originalist grounds.  In Haywood v. 
Drown,88 he argued, based on Framers’ intent, that state courts were not ob-
ligated to hear federal claims,89 a position sufficiently radical that Chief 
                                                          
 79.  See, e.g., Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc. 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2261 (2013) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting); Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 218 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Morse v. 
Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring); Gonzales v Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 57 
(2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 505 (2005) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring); McIn-
tyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 358 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 80.  526 U.S. 314, 331 (1999). 
 81.  380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965). 
 82.  Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 332–36. 
 83.  Id. at 336.  But see Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 42 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(“Stare decisis may call for hesitation in overruling a dubious precedent, but it does not demand 
that such a precedent be expanded to its outer limits.”). 
 84.  Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 341, 343 (Thomas, J., dissenting).   
 85.  Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610 (1997) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 86.  Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 87.  393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 88.  556 U.S. 729 (2009). 
 89.  Id. at 742–68 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Alito declined to join that portion of 
Justice Thomas’s dissent.90  More recently, in McDonald v. City of Chica-
go,91 Justice Thomas argued for a return to the “original meaning” of the 
Fourteenth Amendment that would incorporate certain rights against the 
states via the Privileges or Immunities Clause rather than through the Due 
Process Clause.92  Justice Thomas acknowledged, but was not deterred by, 
the “volume of precedents” resting on the Due Process Clause.93  By con-
trast, Justice Alito and the three other justices who also believed that the 
Second Amendment applied to the states, declined to depart from the 
Slaughter-House Cases94 and refused to join Justice Thomas’s opinion.  In 
Berghuis v. Smith, Justice Thomas wrote a two paragraph concurrence to 
alert potential litigants that he would be willing to reconsider the cases 
guaranteeing defendants in criminal cases a jury that represents “a fair cross 
section of the community” on the grounds that in 1791 the Sixth Amend-
ment conferred no such protection since when the amendment was ratified, 
many states excluded various classes of people from that activity.95  Every 
other justice joined Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court without elabo-
ration. 
Justice Thomas’s devotion to originalism has caused some conserva-
tive academics to regard some of his positions as unduly activist.96  Even 
Justice Scalia has reportedly distinguished his own interpretive methodolo-
gy from that of Justice Thomas in terms that suggest some reservation re-
garding his colleague’s approach.  Justice Scalia reportedly said:  “I am an 
originalist, but I am not a nut.”97 
Justice Thomas has championed originalism but has not followed a 
consistent approach in applying it in his written opinions.98  At times, Jus-
                                                          
 90.  Id. at 742. 
 91.  130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
 92.  Id. at 3062, 3086 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 93.  Id. at 3062–63. 
 94.  83 U.S. 36 (1873). 
 95.  559 U.S. 314, 334 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 96.  See, e.g., Ernest Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 1139, 1166–67 (2002) (criticizing Justice Thomas’s Commerce Clause opinions as activist).  
Cf. Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis and the Promotion of Judicial Restraint, 22 
CONST. COMMENT. 271, 273 (2005) (arguing for reliance on precedent, rather than originalism, to 
promote judicial restraint). 
 97.  JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 120 
(Anchor reprint 2008) (2007). 
 98.  Gregory E. Maggs, Which Original Meaning of the Constitution Matters to Justice 
Thomas?, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 494, 511, 514 (2009).  But see RALPH A. ROSSUM, 
UNDERSTANDING CLARENCE THOMAS: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL RESTORATION 
13 (2014) (arguing that Justice Thomas incorporates different originalist methodologies “into his 
own distinctive original general meaning approach”) 
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tice Thomas has emphasized the Framers’ original intent,99 on other occa-
sions, the Constitution’s original understanding based on how constitutional 
language was interpreted when adopted,100 and sometimes the Constitu-
tion’s original objective meaning when adopted rather than what the Fram-
ers intended or contemporary audiences understood.101  Sometimes, he has 
mixed approaches.102  Although one perceptive scholar sees some virtue in 
                                                          
 99.  See, e.g., Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2264 (2013) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting) (discussing the Framers’ intent regarding the Voter Qualifications Clause); United 
States v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 859–60 (1996) (relying in part on the intent of the 
Framers in interpreting the Export Clause); Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 779 (1996) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (referring to what the Framers did and “sought”); Wilson v. Arkansas, 
514 U.S. 927, 931, 934 (1995) (looking to the Framers’ intent to determine the meaning of “rea-
sonable” in the Fourth Amendment); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 358–59, 363 (1992) (Thom-
as, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (using text and the original intent of the 
drafters to interpret the Confrontation Clause). 
 100.  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2482 (2012) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (criticizing the 
majority opinion as inconsistent with the original understanding of the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishment Clause); Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2751 (2011) (Thomas, J., dis-
senting) (looking to the beliefs of the founding generation to interpret the First Amendment); 
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410–11 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (looking to original 
understanding to interpret the application of the First Amendment to public schools); Troxel v. 
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (applying precedent because parties 
had not argued “that our substantive due process cases were wrongly decided and that the original 
understanding of the Due Process Clause precludes judicial enforcement of unenumerated rights 
under that constitutional provision”); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Thom-
as, J., concurring) (criticizing “substantial effects” test as inconsistent with “original understand-
ing”); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 937 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring) (calling for an 
interpretation of the Commerce Clause based on “original understanding”); McIntyre v. Ohio 
Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 358–59, 370 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (calling for de-
termining whether “freedom of speech” as “originally understood” protected anonymous political 
leafleting). 
 101.  Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2501 (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(applying the original meaning of the Petition Clause); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 
3020, 3058 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring) (seeking to discern how ordinary citizens at the time 
of ratification would have interpreted the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause); Roth-
gery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 218 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (using original mean-
ing to determine the meaning of “criminal prosecution” in the Sixth Amendment); Apprendi v. 
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 518 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing the decision reinstates 
original meaning of Fifth and Sixth Amendments); United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 49–50 
(2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the original meaning of “witness” in the Self-
Incrimination Clause included all who gave evidence not just those who testified); Farmer v. 
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 859 (1994) (using late-eighteenth-century dictionaries to define “punish-
ment”); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 38, 40 (1993) (using late-eighteenth-century dictionar-
ies and other sources to discover “original meaning” of “punishment” when the Eighth Amend-
ment was ratified). 
 102.  PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2580 (2011) (discussing ratification-era prac-
tices to determine meaning); United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 161–62 (2010) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting) (relying on evidence of intent of drafters and ratifiers and invoking intent and un-
derstanding); Fed. Commc’n Comm’n v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 532 (2009) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (articulating original meaning as criteria in a First Amendment case but 
arguably applying original understanding); Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harri-
son, 520 U.S. 564, 621–37 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (referring alternatively to original un-
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Justice Thomas’s pluralistic approach to originalism since it allows him to 
access more historical information, please a wider body of originalist aca-
demics, and defer committing to one originalist approach,103 others point 
out that less fully specified originalist theories lend themselves to ideologi-
cal wobbling.104  In some respects, this flexibility does not distinguish the 
originalist from other constitutional interpreters who use various modes of 
constitutional argument to reach or justify results.  Yet the originalist can 
take little comfort from a conclusion that he or she is no different from oth-
er interpreters.  For the originalist claim of interpretive superiority rests 
largely on the assertion that originalism imposes objective constraints that 
align it with the rule of law.  Nonetheless, Justice Thomas’s many admirers 
praise what they see as his principled commitment to originalism.105 
II.  RACE AND THE DISAPPEARANCE OF ORIGINALISM 
Justice Thomas’s approach to constitutional interpretation is quite dif-
ferent in cases dealing with race.  Here, as elsewhere, Justice Thomas gen-
erally reaches conservative conclusions.  He has repeatedly articulated a 
color-blind Constitution and has argued that a uniform standard of strict 
scrutiny applies whenever a government entity uses a racial classification, 
                                                          
derstanding, original usage, original meaning, and original intent in discussing Import-Export 
Clause); Helling, 509 U.S. at 38 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (using late-eighteenth-century dictionar-
ies and other sources to discover meaning of “punishment” when Eighth Amendment was ratified 
but also focusing on what Framers and ratifiers had “in mind”). 
 103.  Maggs, supra note 98, at 515–16. 
 104.  Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Are Originalist Constitutional Theories Principled, or Are They 
Rationalizations for Conservatism?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 16 (2011) (arguing that ver-
sions of originalism that are not well specified are manipulable to achieve conservative results); 
William P. Marshall, Conservatives and the Seven Sins of Judicial Activism, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 
1217, 1244 (2002) (“Originalism is a doctrine of convenience and, even then, not consistently ap-
plied.”). 
 105.  See, e.g., Richard Albert, The Next Constitutional Revolution, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 
707, 729, 735 (2011) (praising Justice Thomas for his principled commitment to originalism); 
Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 7, 15 (2006); Edwin Meese III, The Jurisprudence of Clarence Thomas, 12 REGENT U. L. 
REV. 349, 349 (2000) (praising Thomas for fidelity to the Constitution and originalism); Timothy 
Sandefur, Clarence Thomas’s Jurisprudence Unexplained, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 535, 553 
(2009) (praising Justice Thomas as a “strong and consistent” originalist); Lee J. Strang, The Most 
Faithful Originalist?: Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia, and the Future of Originalism, 88 U. DET. 
MERCY L. REV. 873, 876–77 (2011) (praising Justice Thomas for the consistency and purity of his 
originalism); see also Maggs, supra note 98, at 510, 516 (describing Justice Thomas as originalist 
but noting that his methodology uses a confluence of original intent, understanding, and meaning); 
John Yoo, Twenty Years of Justice Thomas, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970204485304576642963032597504 (calling 
Justice Thomas the original Constitution’s “greatest defender”); John Yoo, The Real Clarence 
Thomas, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 9, 2007), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB119189308788652936 (call-
ing Justice Thomas “the justice most committed” to the Framers’ intent). 
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whether to burden or benefit a racial minority.106  Yet he reaches and justi-
fies these results without apparent reliance on originalism. 
The characteristics that for two decades have defined so many of Jus-
tice Thomas’s discretionary writings in other constitutional cases disappear 
in his concurrences or dissents in constitutional cases dealing with race.  In 
these opinions, Justice Thomas does not say he is following the original in-
tent, understanding, or meaning of the Constitution.  He does not refer to 
eighteenth or nineteenth century dictionaries or treatises to define terms.  
He does not examine the debates or writings of the relevant Framers or rati-
fiers to fathom their intent or understandings regarding those concepts.  He 
does not explore the practices or expectations of the contemporaneous gen-
erations to try to capture what they meant or thought.  These originalist 
tools, which he has favored for more than two decades in other constitu-
tional cases, are largely absent from his interpretive toolkit in constitutional 
cases dealing with race. 
Justice Thomas’s opinions on race either are bereft of originalist ar-
gument or contain only the most passing originalist references when dis-
cussing the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment—the two constitutional provi-
sions those cases chiefly implicate.  Instead, in these cases, Justice Thomas 
emphasizes arguments based on precedent, as well as consequential and 
moral reasoning. 
A review of five significant constitutional cases dealing with race il-
lustrates these points.  In each case, Justice Thomas wrote a concurring or 
dissenting opinion.  As such, he was not discharging an institutional respon-
sibility to present a consensus view.  The decision to write was discretion-
ary and signaled his desire to address the topic individually rather than rely 
on a colleague’s exposition.  In four of the five cases, no other justice 
joined Justice Thomas’s opinion; although Justice Scalia joined most of 
Justice Thomas’s opinion in the fifth case, Grutter v. Bollinger,107 it, too, 
seemed to reflect Justice Thomas’s unaltered voice.  Thus, the views and 
approach in these opinions can fairly be attributed to Justice Thomas alone.  
Additionally, in four of the five cases, Justice Thomas wrote lengthy opin-
ions in which he necessarily invested a substantial amount of time and had 
plenty of space to develop his approach.  Excluding his two page concur-
rence in Adarand v. Pena,108 these opinions averaged almost twenty-seven 
pages.  Each interpreted the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment’s explicit or 
implicit equal protection guarantee, yet notwithstanding the length of the 
                                                          
 106.  See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1000 (1996) (Thomas, J. concurring) (“Strict scru-
tiny applies to all governmental classifications based on race . . . .”). 
 107.  539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 108.  515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
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opinions, Justice Thomas offered no elaborated originalist presentation.  
These opinions relied instead on other modes of constitutional argument. 
Although the principal issue before the Court in Missouri v. Jenkins109 
was whether the Court could use the interdistrict remedy of magnet schools 
to address intradistrict violations of the Equal Protection Clause, Justice 
Thomas used his concurrence to launch a more broad-based discussion of 
the Court’s Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence in the public school con-
text.110  Justice Thomas’s lengthy concurring opinion recast Brown v. Board 
of Education111 and argued that lower federal courts had exceeded their eq-
uitable powers.  He asserted that Brown “did not need to rely upon any psy-
chological or social-science research in order to announce the simple, yet 
fundamental, truth that the government cannot discriminate among its citi-
zens on the basis of race,” a conclusion he supported with a simple citation: 
“See McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 Va. L. 
Rev. 947 (1995).”112 
Justice Thomas’s terse reference to Professor McConnell’s controver-
sial113 originalist defense of Brown hardly qualifies as much of an original-
ist argument.  Justice Thomas never discussed any of the evidence regard-
ing the original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause but simply asserted 
that at the “heart” of Brown’s “interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause 
lies the principle that the Government must treat citizens as individuals, and 
not as members of racial, ethnic, or religious groups.”114  Justice Thomas 
never specifically said he was justifying Brown on originalist grounds.  In 
his article, Professor McConnell admitted that his attempt to harmonize 
Brown and originalism represented a dramatic break from an overwhelming 
contrary consensus view shared by scholars from across the ideological and 
methodological spectrum, ranging from Ronald Dworkin, Lawrence Tribe, 
and many others on the left, to Raoul Berger, Alexander Bickel, and Robert 
Bork on the right.115  Nonetheless, Justice Thomas did not discuss, or even 
mention, a single work that represented the orthodox thesis Professor 
McConnell’s argument challenged. 
                                                          
 109.  515 U.S. 70 (1995). 
 110.  Id. at 120–21 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 111.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 112.  Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 120 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 113.  See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Re-
sponse to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1883 (1995) (criticizing McConnell’s ar-
gument as failing to justify the result in Brown on an originalist basis); Earl M. Maltz, Originalism 
and the Desegregation Decisions—A Response to Professor McConnell, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 
223, 223 (1996) (arguing that McConnell fails to show school desegregation is consistent with 
original intent or understanding). 
 114.  Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 120–21 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 115.  Michael J. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 
947, 950–52 (1995). 
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Furthermore, it is unclear how much Professor McConnell’s article  
actually helped Justice Thomas reach his conclusion.  Justice Thomas’s 
opinion was issued on June 12, 1995, the case having been argued on Janu-
ary 11, 1995.  Professor McConnell’s article appeared in the May 1995 vol-
ume of the Virginia Law Review.  Unless Justice Thomas had access to an 
early draft, the article could hardly have shaped Justice Thomas’s thinking.  
More likely, the citation was a late addition to his concurrence to support a 
conclusion already reached, which is consistent with Justice Thomas’s fail-
ure to discuss any of the evidence Professor McConnell provided. 
Whereas Justice Thomas’s discussion of the Equal Protection Clause 
relied primarily on precedent, along with moral and consequentialist argu-
ments,116 in discussing the separate and more general point that federal 
courts had exceeded their equity powers117 Justice Thomas presented a 
lengthy originalist argument replete with citations to Blackstone, Thomas 
Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, and Anti-Federalist writings.118  “Such ex-
travagant uses of judicial power are at odds with the history and tradition of 
the equity power and the Framers’ design,” Justice Thomas opined.  “The 
available historical records suggest that the Framers did not intend federal 
equitable remedies to reach as broadly as we have permitted.”119  Justice 
Thomas was an originalist in Jenkins when discussing Article III of the 
Constitution but not when regarding the Equal Protection Clause. 
That same day, in Adarand Constructors v. Pena, Inc.,120 Justice 
Thomas penned a short concurrence in which he equated race-based affirm-
ative action with Jim Crow laws.  He argued that laws designed to subju-
gate a race are morally and constitutionally equivalent to “those that dis-
tribute benefits on the basis of race in order to foster some current notion of 
equality.”121  Justice Thomas wrote that “the paternalism that appears to lie 
at the heart of this [affirmative action] program is at war with the principle 
of inherent equality that underlies and infuses our Constitution.”122  In sup-
                                                          
 116.  See Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 114 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“It never ceases to amaze me that 
the courts are so willing to assume that anything that is predominantly black must be inferior.”); 
id. at 121–122 (“Given that desegregation has not produced the predicted leaps forward in black 
educational achievement, there is no reason to think that black students cannot learn as well when 
surrounded by members of their own race as when they are in an integrated environment.”). 
 117.  U.S. Const. art. III, §§ 1, 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and 
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under their Authority . . . .”). 
 118.  Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 126–31 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 119.  Id. at 126. 
 120.  515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 121.  Id. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 122.  Id.; see also id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (criticizing premise underlying dissents of Jus-
tices Stevens and Ginsburg that “there is a racial paternalism exception to the principle of equal 
protection”). 
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port, he cited only the Declaration of Independence and its proposition that 
“[w]e hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, 
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that 
among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.”123  Justice 
Thomas cited the Declaration but did not argue that it provided the original 
meaning of the Fifth Amendment.  Nor did he explain why the original 
meaning of the Fifth Amendment prohibited racial classifications, especial-
ly those used to help a disadvantaged minority.  Instead, most of his opinion 
attacked such programs as immoral and productive of bad consequences.124 
Those two cases provided Justice Thomas with opportunities to pre-
sent originalist arguments in cases dealing with school desegregation and 
affirmative action.  Both majority opinions relied heavily on precedent.  
Both decisions presented Justice Thomas with an occasion to demonstrate 
that originalism could provide a sturdier foundation for that result.  He let 
that opportunity pass. 
His failure to use originalism to discuss the Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses in these two cases becomes more curious in the context of 
his work on other constitutional matters that term.  Less than two months 
earlier, he wrote concurrences to present originalist interpretations of the 
First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause in McIntyre and of the Commerce 
Clause in Lopez rather than rest conclusions on the non-originalist modes of 
constitutional interpretation in the majority opinions.  In those two cases, 
Justice Thomas thought it important to justify outcomes with extensive cita-
tions to originalist sources rather than rely on a colleague’s opinion reach-
ing the same result based on precedent.  But not in Jenkins or Adarand.  
Less than one month earlier he had presented originalist interpretations of 
the Qualifications Clause and the Tenth Amendment in his dissent in United 
States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton125 and of the Fourth Amendment’s 
Search and Seizure Clause.126  Less than three weeks after  Jenkins and 
Adarand  came down, he made originalist arguments in interpreting the Es-
tablishment Clause in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of 
Virginia.127  Justice Thomas used originalist arguments in these five consti-
tutional cases handed down during spring 1995, just not when he addressed 
race. 
                                                          
 123.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  But see John Eastman, Reflections on Justice 
Thomas’s Twenty Years on the Bench, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 691, 704 (2011) (describing 
Justice Thomas’s citation to the Declaration of Independence as “[e]nough said”). 
 124.  Adarand, 515 U.S. at 241 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 125.  514 U.S. 779 (1995). 
 126.  Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995). 
 127.  515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
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Eight years after Jenkins-Adarand, Justice Thomas failed to base his 
opinion on originalist argument in Grutter v. Bollinger128 where a five-
justice majority upheld the use of race conscious decisionmaking in admis-
sions at the University of Michigan Law School.  Justice Thomas joined 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s principal dissent as well as Justice Scalia’s brief 
opinion but also contributed his own twenty-nine page opinion.  Justice 
Thomas’s opinion was more than three times longer than Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s principal dissent that spoke for four justices.  It occupied 
roughly sixty percent of the space the four dissents used.  Notwithstanding 
its length, the opinion lacked any originalist argument, unless the reference 
in the very last paragraph to “the principle of equality embodied in the Dec-
laration of Independence and the Equal Protection Clause”129 is deemed to 
be such.  The absence of any significant originalist discussion is perhaps 
more noteworthy because Justice Thomas implicitly envisioned the Consti-
tution as a static document, whose meaning did not change over time,130 
thereby inviting an originalist justification.  Justice Thomas discussed prec-
edent and made generous use of consequentialist and moral argument,131 
and used such arguments to support his assertion that the Constitution man-
dates an anti-classification interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause,132 
a conclusion the opinion reiterated frequently.133  Much of his opinion at-
tacked, on consequentialist grounds, the diversity interest Michigan of-
fered—and the Court accepted—for the race conscious admissions pro-
                                                          
 128.  539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 129.  Id. at 378 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 130.  Id. at 351 (“I believe that the Law School’s current use of race violates the Equal Protec-
tion Clause and that the Constitution means the same thing today as it will in 300 months.”). 
 131.  See, e.g., id. at 349 (quoting Frederick Douglass: “What I ask for the negro is not benevo-
lence, not pity, not sympathy, but simply justice.  The American people have always been anxious 
to know what they shall do with us . . . . I have had but one answer from the beginning.  Do noth-
ing with us!  Your doing with us has already played the mischief with us.  Do nothing with us!”); 
id. at 350 (“Like Douglass, I believe blacks can achieve in every avenue of American life without 
the meddling of university administrators.”). 
 132.  Id. at 353–54 (“The Constitution abhors classifications based on race, not only because 
those classifications can harm favored races or are based on illegitimate motives, but also because 
every time the government places citizens on racial registers and makes race relevant to the provi-
sion of burdens or benefits, it demeans us all.  ‘Purchased at the price of immeasurable human 
suffering, the equal protection principle reflects our Nation’s understanding that such classifica-
tions ultimately have a destructive impact on the individual and our society.’”  (quoting Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U. S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in judgment))). 
 133.  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 368 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“What 
the Equal Protection Clause does prohibit are classifications made on the basis of race.”); id. at 
371 (“clearly the majority still cannot commit to the principle that racial classifications are per se 
harmful and that almost no amount of benefit in the eye of the beholder can justify such classifica-
tions.”); see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 281 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I would 
hold that a State’s use of racial discrimination in higher education admissions is categorically pro-
hibited by the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
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gram.  Such programs harmed, rather than helped, African-Americans, in 
part by stigmatizing them,134 and might perpetuate black underperformance 
on standard tests, thereby confirming “the bigot’s prophecy,”135 he argued. 
Similarly, Justice Thomas used non-originalist reasoning in 2007 in 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1.136  
Justice Thomas joined Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court, but 
wrote a separate thirty-four page concurrence to respond to the dissent.  
Again, he repeatedly asserted a broad anti-classification principle,137 but 
one not linked to evidence of original intent, understanding, or meaning.  
The sole originalist reference came in a footnote responding to a point in 
the dissent.  Justice Thomas wrote, “I have no quarrel with the proposition 
that the Fourteenth Amendment sought to bring former slaves into Ameri-
can society as full members.”138  He continued: 
What the dissent fails to understand, however, is that the color-
blind Constitution does not bar the government from taking 
measures to remedy past state-sponsored discrimination—indeed, 
it requires that such measures be taken in certain circumstanc-
es. . . . Race-based government measures during the 1860’s and 
1870’s to remedy state-enforced slavery were therefore not incon-
sistent with the color-blind Constitution.139 
In addition to precedent, Justice Thomas used consequential arguments 
in Parents Involved.  The “race-based student-assignment programs before 
us are not as benign as the dissent believes,” he asserted, since, as he wrote 
in Adarand, “[r]acial paternalism and its unintended consequences can be as 
poisonous and pernicious as any other form of discrimination.”140  This type 
of race conscious decisionmaking “pits the races against one another, exac-
erbates racial tension, and ‘provoke[s] resentment among those who believe 
that they have been wronged by the government’s use of race,’” he stated, 
again citing his Adarand opinion.141  Justice Thomas repeatedly invoked the 
                                                          
 134.  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 373 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 135.  Id. at 377. 
 136.  551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
 137.  Id. at 751 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The Constitution generally prohibits government 
race-based decisionmaking, but this Court has authorized the use of race-based measures for re-
medial purposes in two narrowly defined circumstances.”); see also id. at 752 (“Rather, race-
based government decisionmaking is categorically prohibited unless narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling interest.”); id. (“‘The Constitution abhors classifications based on race . . . .’”); id. 
(“Therefore, as a general rule, all race-based government decisionmaking—regardless of con-
text—is unconstitutional.”); id. at 758 (“We have made it unusually clear that strict scrutiny ap-
plies to every racial classification.”); id. at 766 n.14 (“The United States Constitution dictates that 
local governments cannot make decisions on the basis of race.”). 
 138.  Id. at 772 n.19. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. at 759 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 141.  Id. 
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“colorblind” Constitution142 metaphor, an ideal he associated with the first 
Justice Harlan and with Thurgood Marshall,143 while likening the dissenters 
in Parents Involved to the segregationists in Brown v. Board of Education.  
Once again, he failed to connect that idea to originalist sources. 
Most recently, in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin,144 Justice 
Thomas joined Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion but wrote a concurring 
opinion to argue that Grutter should be overruled.  His twenty page opinion 
exceeded the combined length of the majority opinion, Justice Scalia’s con-
currence, and Justice Ginsburg’s dissent but contained no originalist argu-
ment.  Justice Thomas cited his concurring or dissenting opinions in Jen-
kins, Adarand, and Grutter regarding the perils of racial classification and 
argued that Grutter was inconsistent with the Court’s precedents.  Racial 
diversity could not produce benefits that would satisfy the Court’s “compel-
ling interest” or “pressing necessity” tests.  The premise of much of his ar-
gument was that race-based decisionmaking, whether for Jim Crow segre-
gation or affirmative action, are moral equivalents.  Finally, he made the 
utilitarian argument that affirmative action has “insidious consequences.”145  
He never suggested, however, that the original intent, understanding, expec-
tation, or meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment precluded race conscious 
decisionmaking to produce diversity nor did he offer any historical evi-
dence to support those positions.146 
In view of Justice Thomas’s professed commitment to originalism and 
the prominent role some variation of that methodology plays in so many of 
his significant constitutional opinions, his quite different approach in race 
cases is, to say the least, intriguing.  In constitutional cases involving race, 
he does not explicitly invoke originalism and his references to originalist 
sources, if any, are striking in their brevity and cryptic nature.  If anything, 
the summary of these five cases dealing with race overstates his resort to 
originalism since it presents each potentially originalist reference in those 
                                                          
 142.  Id. at 772 (“Most of the dissent’s criticisms of today’s result can be traced to its rejection 
of the colorblind Constitution.”); id. at 780 (“In place of the colorblind Constitution, the dissent 
would permit measures to keep the races together and proscribe measures to keep the races 
apart.”); id. at 782 (“Because ‘[o]ur Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates 
classes among citizens,’ such race-based decisionmaking is unconstitutional.”). 
 143.  For a criticism of the assertion that Thurgood Marshall and the other attorneys represent-
ing school children in Brown were anti-classificationists, see Joel K. Goldstein, Not Hearing His-
tory: A Critique of Chief Justice Roberts’ Reinterpretation of Brown, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 791 (2008).  
 144.  133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
 145.  Id. at 2431 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 146.  This brief summary does not exhaust the constitutional cases dealing with race in which 
Justice Thomas has written discretionary opinions without invoking originalism.  See, e.g., Bush 
v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 999–1000 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing for an application of 
strict scrutiny to review intentional creation of majority-minority districts based on Adarand, not 
originalism).  
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opinions though greatly condensing the non-originalist arguments that dom-
inate those opinions.  Whereas, generally, Justice Thomas presents the 
originalist arguments for his positions in detail, with extensive citation to 
wide-ranging sources, in race cases, he mentions the few originalist refer-
ences in passing  and with  little or no elaboration to suggest that they estab-
lish original intent, understanding, or meaning.  Instead, he relies on prece-
dent and on moral and consequentialist arguments, all of which are 
delivered in an impassioned manner.  A reader of Justice Thomas’s consti-
tutional opinions on race might find them powerful and compelling, but not 
originalist. 
The discrepancy between Justice Thomas’s methodology in constitu-
tional cases involving race and those involving many other constitutional 
subjects is only part of what invites attention.  It becomes even more sus-
pect due to the uneasy fit perceived between originalism and the conclu-
sions Justice Thomas reaches in race cases involving claims of equal pro-
tection. 
First, most who have studied the subject doubt that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment’s Due Pro-
cess Clause, based on originalist methodology alone, proscribed “separate 
but equal” in public schools.  A strong consensus has concluded that neither 
the Framers nor ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment nor informed citi-
zens at the time expected the Amendment to outlaw racially segregated 
schools.147  Unless the expected applications of the ratifiers or the public are 
ignored in determining original meaning or unless original meaning is de-
termined at a very high level of generality, as some advocate, it is hard to 
                                                          
 147.  See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Deci-
sion, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 58–59 (1955) (concluding that Congress, which drafted the Fourteenth 
Amendment, did not intend to preclude segregated schools); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Are Original-
ist Theories Principled, or Are They Rationalizations for Conservatism?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 5, 10 (2011); Randall Kennedy, Colorblind Constitutionalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 4 
(2013); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Pro-
fessor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1881 (1995); Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History 
of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 252 & n.180 (1991); Earl M. Maltz, Original-
ism and the Desegregation Decisions—A Response to Professor McConnell, 13 CONST. 
COMMENT. 223, 224, 226, 231 (1996); David A. Strauss, Do We Have a Living Constitution?, 59 
DRAKE L. REV. 973, 978 (2011); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489–90 (1954) 
(describing original intent as “inconclusive” but rejecting the idea that constitutional meaning in 
1954 is equivalent to that in 1868); JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 105 (2011) (criticiz-
ing McConnell for focusing on the original expected application of the drafters but noting in his 
statement that the ratifiers and the public supported school segregation).  But see Michael W. 
McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 953–54 (1995) 
[hereinafter McConnell, Desegregation Decisions] (contesting scholarly consensus and arguing 
that in the decade following ratification of Fourteenth Amendment many political leaders believed 
it outlawed school segregation); Michael W. McConnell, The Originalist Justification for Brown: 
A Reply to Professor Klarman, 81 VA. L. REV. 1937, 1937 (1995).  
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reconcile Brown and Bolling with originalism.148  Many originalists once 
conceded as much.149  Since an interpretive theory must be measured in part 
based on the substantive outcomes it generates,150 any inconsistency be-
tween originalism and Brown-Bolling impeaches originalism rather serious-
ly. 
Justice Thomas is certainly not prepared to relinquish either holding.  
He has criticized the Court’s reasoning in Brown151 but has left no doubt 
that he believes it and Bolling were correctly decided.152  On other occa-
sions, he has determined original meaning based on the actual or expected 
applications the framing generation gave various constitutional language.153  
Giving such priority to expected applications of the 1791 or 1868 genera-
tions regarding the constitutionality of segregated schools would make both 
decisions problematic.154  Justice Thomas has  not addressed this problem 
in relation to his professed theory. 
                                                          
 148.  Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 
204, 233 (1980) (“I cannot think of a plausible argument against [the Bolling] result—other than 
the entirely correct originalist observation that it is not supported by even a generous reading of 
the fifth amendment.”); Fallon, supra note 147, at 10; William P. Marshall, Progressive Constitu-
tionalism, Originalism, and the Significance of Landmark Decisions in Evaluating Constitutional 
Theory, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1251, 1262–63 (2011); David A. Strauss, Originalism, Precedent, and 
Candor, 22 CONST. COMMENT 299, 304–05 (2005). 
 149.  See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Originalist Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 73 
CORNELL L. REV. 350, 352 (1988) (suggesting that desegregation cases were inconsistent with 
original intent of Constitution); Lino A. Graglia, “Constitutional Theory”: The Attempted Justifi-
cation for the Supreme Court’s Liberal Political Program, 65 TEX. L. REV. 789, 796–97 (1987); 
Hans A. Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 233–34 (1972) (sug-
gesting Bolling was wrong in concluding the Fifth Amendment prohibited segregated schools in 
Washington, D.C. based on its text, history, and political structure, all of which differed from that 
of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 150.  Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 535, 
538–39, 579 (1999) (arguing for the relevancy of likely outcomes of a theory in assessing it).  Cf. 
McConnell, Desegregation Decisions, supra note 147, at 952 (conceding that any theory not able 
to generate the result in Brown would be discredited). 
 151.  See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 120–21 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 152.  See id. (supporting outcome but not rationale in Brown); Thomas Hearings, supra note 6, 
at 414 (stating he has no quarrel with Bolling). 
 153.  See, e.g., Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2184 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (using 
practice at the time of the founding to determine the meaning of the Fifth Amendment Self In-
crimination Clause); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (us-
ing actual and expected applications to argue that the First Amendment does not protect student 
speech); McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 364 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in 
judgment) (using expected and actual applications to argue that the First Amendment protected 
anonymous speech); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 897–98 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) (using 
early practice to argue that multi-member districts were not unconstitutional). 
 154.  Berger, supra note 149, at 352; see also supra note 147.  Cf. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 
U.S. 483, 489 (1954) (terming circumstances surrounding the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as “[a]t best . . . inconclusive” regarding the constitutionality of separate but equal). 
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Second, originalism raises questions regarding Justice Thomas’s re-
peated insistence that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment envision a 
color-blind Constitution and compel an anti-classificationist approach.  
Some respected scholars have argued that those conclusions are inconsistent 
with originalism.  They have argued that, based on originalist sources these 
clauses permit race conscious decisionmaking to benefit blacks and, in the 
case of the Fourteenth Amendment, were actually designed to protect 
blacks, not whites.155  Some of this scholarship has been around for dec-
ades, yet in his opinions, Justice Thomas has neither adopted nor even dis-
cussed these findings that suggest affirmative action is consistent with orig-
inal meaning.156  This silence is intriguing,157 especially since Justice 
Thomas managed to cite Professor McConnell’s article the month after it 
was published. 
It is, of course, possible to argue that Justice Thomas’s commitment to 
anti-classificationism and color-blindness reflect the best interpretations of 
equal protection, but these conclusions are contested, controversial, and not 
the only plausible readings of the text.  Nor are they compelled by original-
ism.  Raoul Berger wrote in 1988 that words like equal protection are “sus-
ceptible of an enormous range of meaning.”158  He cautioned that unless 
cabined by original intent, “those words serve as a crystal ball from which a 
judge, like a soothsayer, can draw forth anything he wants.”159  Justice 
Thomas has not based his conclusions regarding the meaning of that lan-
guage on evidence of original intent, understanding, expectations, or mean-
ing.  He has simply asserted his reading and justified it using precedential, 
moral, and consequential arguments. 
                                                          
 155.  Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 427, 429–432 (1997) (claiming 
that proponents of the Fourteenth Amendment passed laws specifically directed to benefit blacks); 
Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 
VA. L. REV. 753, 754 (1985) (asserting that the Fourteenth Amendment intended affirmative ac-
tion be used to help blacks); Stephen A. Siegel, The Federal Government’s Power to Enact Color-
Conscious Laws: An Originalist Inquiry, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 477, 481–82 (1998); see also Jonathan 
L. Entin, Justice Thomas, Race, and the Constitution Through the Lens of Booker T. Washington 
and W.E.B. Du Bois, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 755, 755 (2011); Marshall, supra note 104, at 
1230 (stating that strong historical evidence suggests affirmative action is consistent with the 
Framers’ view of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 156.  See, e.g., André Douglas Pond Cummings, Grutter v. Bollinger, Clarence Thomas, Af-
firmative Action and the Treachery of Originalism: “The Sun Don’t Shine Here in This Part of 
Town,” 21 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 1, 46, 62 (2005) (criticizing Thomas for not considering 
evidence that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended affirmative action be used to 
help blacks); Fallon, supra note 147, at 17; Rubenfeld, supra note 155, at, 427, 432. 
 157.  See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 104, at 1230 (accusing conservatives of selective use of 
originalism). 
 158.  Berger, supra note 149, at 351. 
 159.  Id.  
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The disparity is obvious between Justice Thomas’s professed and fre-
quent recourse to originalism in constitutional cases generally and his aban-
donment of it when race is involved.  Although some of Justice Thomas’s 
admirers have celebrated his principled originalism with little or no recog-
nition of its disappearance in race cases, Professor Scott Gerber, the author 
of a book-length study of Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence and of other 
works about him, has observed that Justice Thomas uses a different ap-
proach in interpreting constitutional provisions regarding race  than he em-
ploys for those relating to other matters.160  Professor Gerber has offered 
what he characterizes as the oversimplified generalization that “Justice 
Thomas is a ‘liberal originalist’ on civil rights and a ‘conservative original-
ist’ on civil liberties and federalism.”  He argues that “Justice Thomas ap-
peals to the ideal of equality at the heart of the Declaration of Independ-
ence” in interpreting constitutional clauses regarding race, but to “the 
Framers’ specific intentions” in addressing certain other constitutional is-
sues.161  Professor Gerber concludes that, in race cases, Justice Thomas’s 
classical liberal or Lockean approach is reflected in his insistence that “the 
Government must treat citizens as individuals, and not as members of ra-
cial, ethnic or religious groups.”162  Professor Gerber has recently repeated 
this analysis which he initially based on his study of Justice Thomas’s first 
years on the Court.  In a 2011 article, he wrote that Justice Thomas’s civil 
rights opinions invoke “the principle of inherent equality at the heart of the 
Declaration of Independence.”163 
To be sure, before joining the Court, Justice Thomas argued that the 
commitment of the Declaration of Independence to equality and liberty an-
imated the Constitution164 and that the latter should be read accordingly.  
This argument seems problematic in assigning original meaning to the Con-
stitution of 1789 or 1791 given the document’s acceptance of slavery and 
racial inequality.165  The Declaration may have expressed a powerful aspira-
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tion but it seems hard to argue that the Constitution’s original intent or 
meaning was anti-classificationist, color-blind or racially egalitarian since it 
protected slavery166 and treated slaves as three-fifths of a person.167  Indeed, 
during his confirmation hearings, Judge Thomas acknowledged that the 
Civil War Amendments were necessary to end slavery, a concession that 
would seem to rebut any effort to construe the original meaning of the pre-
Civil War Constitution as precluding discrimination against blacks.168  
Moreover, any effort to give “liberty” in the Fifth Amendment such a robust 
reading would conflict with Justice Thomas’s general approach to Due Pro-
cess which assigns “liberty” a much more modest meaning and views the 
Clause as providing procedural, not substantive, protections.169 
Yet even if the Declaration did infuse the Constitution’s original 
meaning with egalitarianism (notwithstanding the inconsistent practices and 
attitude of many of the Framers and their generation), Justice Thomas has 
not asserted that point in race cases to justify his conclusions.  On those few 
occasions where he has invoked the Declaration, he has done so in conclu-
sory fashion170 without offering anything even approaching  an argument 
that it provides the original meaning of the Constitution or the evidence to 
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support that position.  In McDonald v. City of Chicago, he asserted that 
“slavery, and the measures designed to protect it, were irreconcilable with 
the principles of equality, government by consent, and inalienable rights 
proclaimed by the Declaration of Independence and embedded in our con-
stitutional structure.”171  Justice Thomas supported that proposition by cit-
ing one statement by Luther Martin at the Philadelphia Convention and 
Abraham Lincoln’s 1854 Peoria Speech.  It seems unnecessary to state that 
these two citations, separately and together, do not provide an originalist 
case that the Declaration of Independence was part of the Constitution or 
that the Constitution that allowed slavery prohibited discrimination against 
blacks.  Justice Thomas implicitly conceded the point in his next statement 
when he acknowledged that “[a]fter the war, a series of constitutional 
amendments were adopted to repair the Nation from the damage slavery 
had caused.”172  If the Declaration provides the original meaning of the 
Constitution in race cases, one would expect Justice Thomas to cite it rou-
tinely in judicial opinions and to provide an explanation in them regarding 
why his conclusion is compelling.173  He has rarely cited the Declaration in 
opinions and has not explained why his conclusion is compelling in his 
opinions on the Court. 
Moreover, even if Professor Gerber accurately stated the difference in 
Justice Thomas’s approach (that is, liberal vs. conservative originalist) his 
description does not justify that dichotomy in the context of Justice Thom-
as’s other judicial behavior.  To be sure, “liberty” and “equal protection” 
are abstract concepts but so, too, are “freedom of speech” and “cruel and 
unusual punishment” among other constitutional terms.  In construing other 
open-ended language, Justice Thomas has often looked to the intent, beliefs, 
and practices of the Framers and ratifiers to infer meaning.174  Why, for in-
stance, does Justice Thomas believe it appropriate to invoke original expec-
tations in determining whether anonymous leafleting or children’s speech 
are “freedom of speech” or whether executing a fourteen-year-old is “cruel 
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and unusual,” but he does not consider whether the founders or their gen-
eration believed in desegregated schools or affirmative action? 
Most recently, in fact after this Article was submitted for considera-
tion, Professor Ralph A. Rossum published a book-length study of Justice 
Thomas’s jurisprudence in which he argued that Justice Thomas has fol-
lowed an original general meaning approach to constitutional interpretation 
including cases dealing with race.175  Starting from Professor Maggs’s in-
sight that Justice Thomas has used original intent, understanding, and pub-
lic meaning in different cases, Professor Rossum argues that Justice Thom-
as “has incorporated all three of these approaches into his own distinctive 
original general meaning approach” which he uses when the meaning of the 
Constitution’s text is not apparent.176 
Putting aside the accuracy of Professor Rossum’s claim that Justice 
Thomas uses a coherent and distinctive “original general meaning ap-
proach,” one  which seems inconsistent with language Justice Thomas has 
sometimes used celebrating original intent or understanding, Professor Ros-
sum demonstrates convincingly that Justice Thomas uses the various 
originalist arguments to interpret a range of constitutional clauses.  He is 
less persuasive when he argues that Justice Thomas uses his original gen-
eral meaning approach in cases dealing with race. 
The problem Professor Rossum’s argument encounters is that Justice 
Thomas simply has not invoked original intent, original understanding, 
original expected applications, or original public meaning in his opinions 
dealing with constitutional questions involving race to interpret the Equal 
Protection or Due Process Clauses.  Indeed, in his twenty-two page sum-
mary of Justice Thomas’s opinions in these cases,177 Professor Rossum uses 
the phrase “original general meaning” only once, and then in describing 
Justice Thomas’s discussion of the Court’s equitable powers under Article 
III in Missouri v. Jenkins,178 not regarding any clause protecting equality or 
liberty in the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments. 
Professor Rossum does view Justice Thomas’s positions on desegrega-
tion and racial preference in these cases as originalist, but based largely on 
arguments Justice Thomas made in two short law review articles179 he 
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wrote before he joined the Court180 in which he argued that the Declaration 
of Independence animates the Constitution.  Although Justice Thomas has 
cited the Declaration twice in cases dealing with race, it is curious to say the 
least that he has not incorporated the arguments from, or cited to, these arti-
cles in his opinions dealing with race during the twenty-three years he has 
served on the Court.  Moreover, his articles offer little evidence that the 
original intent, original understanding, original expected applications, or 
original meaning of the original Constitution or the Civil War Amendments 
incorporated the Declaration.  They likewise offer little evidence that “liber-
ty” or “equal protection” were intended, understood, or meant by the found-
ers or by the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment (or by their respective 
generations) to prohibit racial segregation or race conscious decision-
making to benefit African-Americans.  That Justice Thomas believes the 
Declaration’s commitment to equality leads to these conclusions does not 
mean that the original intent, understanding, meaning, or the original gen-
eral meaning of its or the Constitution’s concepts produces that result.  
Those questions depend on historical proof, yet the sort of evidence that 
Justice Thomas frequently presents in discussing other constitutional claus-
es from contemporary dictionaries and legal treatises,  from the debates 
proposing or ratifying the relevant constitutional language and from con-
temporary practice is absent from his opinions on race and from these arti-
cles. 
Professor Jonathan Entin has taken a different approach in discussing 
Justice Thomas’s general commitment to originalism yet its absence in his 
opinions on race.  He has recognized that race cases present a “conspicuous 
exception” to Justice Thomas’s commitment to originalism181 but has ar-
gued that Justice Thomas’s “powerful and distinctive argument against af-
firmative action” and in support of color blindness “deserves serious con-
sideration on its own terms.”182  Ultimately, Justice Thomas’s approach in 
these cases “demonstrates that even a committed originalist need not blind-
ly follow any particular interpretive theory, especially when addressing im-
portant questions to which the Constitution does not provide explicit an-
swers.”183 
Even if one agrees that Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence in the constitu-
tional cases involving race “deserves serious consideration,” Professor En-
tin is quite generous in excusing this inconsistency in Justice Thomas’s ju-
risprudence.  For Justice Thomas, originalism does not provide one 
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interpretive tool in a pluralistic jurisprudential approach that recognizes the 
validity of various forms of constitutional argument.  On the contrary, Jus-
tice Thomas has celebrated originalism as the only “legitimate” and “impar-
tial” way to interpret the Constitution and has likened non-originalist ap-
proaches to “mak[ing] it up” and compared their constitutional validity to 
that of “the latest football scores.”184  Professor Entin may be right that Jus-
tice Thomas’s race jurisprudence is “powerful and distinctive” and merits 
serious consideration, but that does not explain the disappearance of 
originalism in those opinions and the resort there to forms of argument Jus-
tice Thomas has disparaged. 
What is striking is not simply the discrepancy between Justice Thom-
as’s repeated and uncompromising professed commitment to originalism 
and his reliance on it in many constitutional cases on the one hand and his 
abandonment of it in those dealing with race on the other hand.  What is al-
so noteworthy is Justice Thomas’s failure to account for this deviation be-
tween his approach in race cases and his prescription of originalism as es-
sential to judicial impartiality; this silence is disappointing, particularly 
from a justice who has been relatively outspoken otherwise regarding con-
stitutional interpretation. 
Ultimately, the marked divergence suggests that something other than 
originalism really drives his jurisprudence, at least in part.  One possibility 
is that political conservatism, not originalism, motivates Justice Thomas’s 
judicial behavior.185  With few exceptions,186 he reaches conservative re-
sults in constitutional cases when he deploys some originalist methodology 
and in race cases when he abandons it.  This explanation is neither novel187 
nor particularly surprising.  Originalism tends to be associated with con-
servative justices and academics.  Originalism has been “a central organiz-
ing principle” for the conservative assault on the liberal decisions of the 
1960s and 1970s and has furnished a tool for political mobilization as well 
as for jurisprudential use.188  Moreover, as Richard H. Fallon, Jr. has point-
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ed out, originalists, like others, tend to justify their methodology in part on 
consequential grounds, a practice that inevitably invites their ideology into 
the calculation.189  Originalism thus may appeal to Justice Thomas as an in-
strument to reach results consistent with his conservative ideology.  When it 
fails to lead to conservative results, he may sacrifice the instrument for the 
preferred outcome. 
There are, however, some responses to this argument.  Not often, but 
occasionally, Justice Thomas uses originalism to reach or defend a result 
that is not ostensibly conservative.  For instance, in McIntyre, he used an 
originalist argument to strike down a statute that would have limited anon-
ymous political speech.190  The majority consisted largely of more liberal 
justices—Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer—although Justices 
O’Connor and Kennedy also joined Justice Stevens’s opinion while Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia dissented.  More recently, Justice 
Thomas concluded that the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment guar-
anteed a criminal defendant a jury trial with respect to a finding that could 
increase a mandatory minimum sentence.191  Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, So-
tomayor, and Kagan joined all or part of his opinion, whereas the four more 
conservative justices dissented. 
There is, however, a second, more complicated, possibility.  It may be 
that Justice Thomas is generally committed to originalism for jurispruden-
tial reasons and that this commitment helps explain his behavior in most 
constitutional areas.  But he also has strong beliefs and feelings about cer-
tain issues that arise in constitutional cases relating to race.  It may be that 
in these cases the strength of these perspectives simply overwhelms his at-
tachment to the dictates of originalism. 
III.  JUSTICE THOMAS AND RACE 
There is more worth saying about Justice Thomas’s treatment of race 
in constitutional cases than noting his abandonment of originalism in that 
context for more than two decades.  That observation begins rather than 
ends the discussion.  Justice Thomas’s work on the Supreme Court on con-
stitutional cases involving race is distinctive and revealing.  The topic en-
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gages him often.  He writes about race with a passion rarely evident in his 
Supreme Court opinions. 
Justice Thomas’s distinctive engagement in constitutional matters 
dealing with race is evident in at least three ways.  First, Justice Thomas of-
ten writes discretionary opinions about racial issues, both in cases where 
those matters are presented for decision as well as in cases addressing other 
topics.  Mention has previously been made of Justice Thomas’s concurrenc-
es in Adarand, Jenkins, Parents Involved, and Fisher, and his opinion in 
Grutter, all of which addressed either school desegregation or race-
conscious decisionmaking.  These five opinions represent only part of Jus-
tice Thomas’s corpus of judicial writings dealing with race. 
Justice Thomas’s engagement regarding matters dealing with race be-
came apparent during his first term on the Court.  In Georgia v. 
McCollum,192 a case argued only four months after he joined the Court, Jus-
tice Thomas criticized the line of cases holding that the Constitution limits 
the use of peremptory challenges on racial grounds in jury selection.193  Jus-
tice Thomas argued that the cases, beginning with Batson v. Kentucky,194 
“take[] us further from the reasoning and the result of Strauder v. West Vir-
ginia”195 and would produce regrettable consequences in “restricting a 
criminal defendant’s use of such challenges.”196 Justice Thomas worried 
about the impact on black criminal defendants.197  “I am certain that black 
criminal defendants will rue the day that this Court ventured down this road 
that inexorably will lead to the elimination of peremptory strikes,” he 
wrote.198  Justice Thomas thought the Court should recognize that racial 
composition impacted jury outcomes and accordingly should allow race-
motivated peremptory strikes based on the supposition that racial identity 
would affect juror behavior.199 
In United States v. Fordice,200 argued the month after he joined the 
Court, Justice Thomas agreed with the Court’s conclusion that aspects of 
Mississippi’s system of higher education still reflected effects of policies 
traceable to de jure segregation but wrote a separate concurrence partly to 
argue that the Court’s standard “portends neither the destruction of histori-
cally black colleges nor the severing of those institutions from their distinc-
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tive histories and traditions.”201  Although a state could not close “particular 
institutions, historically white or historically black, to particular racial 
groups,” Justice Thomas argued that “it hardly follows that a State cannot 
operate a diverse assortment of institutions—including historically black 
institutions—open to all on a race-neutral basis, but with established tradi-
tions and programs that might disproportionately appeal to one race or an-
other.”202  Justice Thomas insisted on a race neutral admissions policy, yet 
his resolution specifically endorsed State activity promoting, on a race con-
scious basis, programs to appeal to “particular racial groups.”203  Justice 
Thomas clearly believed that historically black colleges have continuing 
value, an idea he has reiterated more recently,204 and noted the irony if “the 
institutions that sustained blacks during segregation were themselves de-
stroyed in an effort to combat its vestiges.”205  Justice Thomas distinguished 
between such “institutional diversity,” which was designed to confer educa-
tional advantage, from duplication designed to separate students based on 
race.206 
In the voting rights context, Justice Thomas has attacked approaches 
that, in his view, equate race with political interests or suggest that minori-
ties only receive representation by those from their racial group.207  In 
Holder v. Hall, Justice Thomas accused the Court of “systematically divid-
ing the country into electoral districts along racial lines—an enterprise of 
segregating the races into political homelands that amounts, in truth, to 
nothing short of a system of ‘political apartheid.’”208  The Court’s voting 
dilution jurisprudence “should be repugnant to any nation that strives for 
the ideal of a color-blind Constitution.”209  Justice Thomas complained that 
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the Court’s approach would “exacerbate racial tensions” and “deepen racial 
divisions by destroying any need for voters or candidates to build bridges 
between racial groups or to form voting coalitions.”210 
To be sure, Georgia v. McCollum, United States v. Fordice, and Hold-
er v. Hall were cases in which race was closely connected to the issue pre-
sented to the Court for decision.  Yet Justice Thomas has introduced Amer-
ica’s racial history or public policy considerations regarding race into 
opinions in cases where the constitutional issues presented for decision had 
a more tenuous relationship to race.  In Dawson v. Delaware,211 Justice 
Thomas alone dissented from a decision holding that Delaware had improp-
erly offered evidence at a sentencing hearing about a defendant’s member-
ship in the Aryan Brotherhood Prison Gang.212  Justice Thomas disagreed 
with the conclusion of the other justices that membership simply associated 
Dawson with abstract ideas, not actions, in violation of the First Amend-
ment.213  Justice Thomas thought the jury could reasonably infer past for-
bidden activity and future dangerous behavior from such membership.214  
To some extent, Justice Thomas’s difference with the others on the Court 
stemmed from the fact that Dawson belonged to a prison gang, not neces-
sarily the Aryan Brotherhood.  Yet he frequently referenced Dawson’s as-
sociation with a “racist” gang and argued that the jury could reasonably in-
fer that its members acted upon “their racial prejudice.”215  Justice Thomas 
argued that Dawson’s membership in the Aryan Brotherhood suggested bad 
character, which was relevant information for the jury.216 
In Graham v. Collins,217 Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion 
largely dedicated to connecting the restrictions on death penalty sentences 
to the Court’s concern with race bias against blacks.  Justice Thomas ended 
a five page discussion by concluding that “[i]t cannot be doubted that be-
hind the Court’s condemnation of unguided discretion lay the specter of ra-
cial prejudice—the paradigmatic capricious and irrational sentencing fac-
tor.”218 
In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,219 Justice Thomas wrote a concurring 
opinion in a case considering whether a Cleveland school voucher plan vio-
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lated the Establishment Clause.  He argued that the Establishment Clause 
did not limit states as much as it restricted the federal government.220  But 
the thrust of his concurrence addressed the lack of educational opportunities 
for inner city minorities.  “Today, however, the promise of public school 
education has failed poor inner-city blacks,” he wrote.221  While the “co-
gnoscenti” might champion “the romanticized ideal of universal public edu-
cation,” “poor urban families” had an altogether different priority, namely 
“the best education for their children.”222 
The following term, Justice Thomas used Virginia v. Black,223 a case 
concerning whether a Virginia statute outlawing cross-burning to intimidate 
someone violated the First Amendment, to deliver a historical discussion 
regarding the racist underpinnings of cross-burning.224  Justice Thomas had 
previously denounced the Ku Klux Klan (“KKK”) and its use of the cross in 
Capitol Square Review Board v. Pinette.225  Although Pinette involved a 
municipality’s denial of the KKK’s petition to display, not burn, a cross on 
public property, Justice Thomas  was moved to write separately to recall, 
and denounce, the KKK’s history.  He wrote: 
 There is little doubt that the Klan’s main objective is to estab-
lish a racist white government in the United States.  In Klan cer-
emony, the cross is a symbol of white supremacy and a tool for 
the intimidation and harassment of racial minorities, Catholics, 
Jews, Communists, and any other groups hated by the Klan.  The 
cross is associated with the Klan not because of religious wor-
ship, but because of the Klan’s practice of cross burning . . . .226 
The Klan, Justice Thomas wrote, had “appropriated one of the most sacred 
of religious symbols as a symbol of hate.”227 
He reprised that theme in 2003 in Virginia v. Black.  Justice Thomas 
signaled the importance of the issue by participating in a surprising forum 
for him, oral argument on December 11, 2002.  Justice Thomas twice ac-
cused the Deputy Solicitor General, representing the President George W. 
Bush Justice Department, of “understating . . . the effects” of cross-burning, 
three times associated the KKK with terror, and called cross-burning a 
unique activity.228 
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Justice Thomas continued that discussion in his solitary dissent where 
he argued that cross-burning could never be protected speech.  “In every 
culture, certain things acquire meaning well beyond what outsiders can 
comprehend,” he began, and cross-burning was “the paradigmatic example” 
of the “profane.”229  The KKK is “[t]he world’s oldest, most persistent ter-
rorist organization” and one long engaged in criminal activity and still fa-
natically opposing racial equality, he wrote.230  Cross-burning was not a 
form of expression but vicious, terroristic conduct, and even the Virginia 
legislature of the 1950s, one which favored segregationist expression, un-
derstood the difference.  He wrote: 
 It strains credulity to suggest that a state legislature that adopted 
a litany of segregationist laws self-contradictorily intended to 
squelch the segregationist message.  Even for segregationists, 
violent and terroristic conduct, the Siamese twin of cross burning, 
was intolerable.  The ban on cross burning with intent to intimi-
date demonstrates that even segregationists understood the differ-
ence between intimidating and terroristic conduct and racist ex-
pression.  It is simply beyond belief that, in passing the statute 
now under review, the Virginia Legislature was concerned with 
anything but penalizing conduct it must have viewed as particu-
larly vicious.231 
Whereas Virginia v. Black provided an occasion for Justice Thomas to 
discuss at length the KKK’s racist activities in a free speech case, he wrote 
a discretionary opinion in Kelo v. New London,232 a takings case, to discuss 
the adverse impact of urban renewal programs on African-Americans.  Jus-
tice Thomas joined Justice O’Connor’s principal dissent but also wrote sep-
arately, primarily to argue that the Court had strayed from the original 
meaning of the Public Use requirement of the Takings Clause.233  But at the 
end of his opinion he discussed the “consequences of today’s decision,” 
namely the tendency of urban renewal programs disproportionately to hurt 
poor, urban nonwhite communities.234  “Urban renewal projects have long 
been associated with the displacement of blacks,” and the decision in Kelo 
would “exacerbate these effects.”235 
                                                          
 229. Virginia, 538 U.S. at 388 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 230.  Id. at 388–89 (quoting M. NEWTON & J. NEWTON, THE KU KLUX KLAN: AN 
ENCYCLOPEDIA vii (1991)).  
 231.  Id. at 394. 
 232.  545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 233.  Id. at 514–23 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
 234.  Id. at 521.  
 235.  Id. at 522. 
  
118 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 74:79 
More recently, in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. 1 v. 
Holder,236 Justice Thomas departed from the other justices, who all joined 
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in concluding that granting a litigant bailout 
relief under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act avoided the constitutional 
issue.237  Only Justice Thomas reached the constitutional issue and conclud-
ed that Section 5 was unconstitutional.  In explaining why it was no longer 
constitutional, he devoted seven paragraphs to describing how blacks were 
denied the vote for decades through the use of violence as well as “subtle 
methods.”238 
Finally, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, Justice Thomas wrote a con-
curring opinion to argue that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or 
Immunities Clause, not its Due Process Clause, was the vehicle by which 
the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms was made applicable as 
against the states.239  A considerable portion of his rather lengthy opinion is 
devoted to discussing efforts in the south before and after the Civil War to 
terrorize African-Americans, including disarming them to render them de-
fenseless against mob violence.240  He argued that the public understood the 
purpose of the Privileges or Immunities Clause as affording protection to 
African-Americans of rights of citizens including the right to keep and bear 
arms for defensive purposes.241 
These examples illustrate Justice Thomas’s practice of using discre-
tionary opinions to recount aspects of America’s racist past or express con-
cerns regarding the impact of certain constitutional doctrine or public poli-
cies on racial minorities.  Although some of the cases address constitutional 
issues under the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses, in other instances 
Justice Thomas introduced race-related considerations in cases which osten-
sibly involved other constitutional provisions. 
The intensity of these opinions suggests a second characteristic of Jus-
tice Thomas’s work when he writes about race.  In these opinions, Justice 
Thomas’s rhetoric often suggests a high degree of  engagement, indeed pas-
sion, in the positions advanced.  For instance, he began his concurrence in 
Missouri v. Jenkins by observing, “It never ceases to amaze me that the 
courts are so willing to assume that anything that is predominantly black 
must be inferior.”242  He went on to argue that those who identify “racial 
isolation” as a vice subscribe to a “theory of black inferiority.”243 
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In Adarand, he argued that morally, as well as constitutionally, affirm-
ative action was as objectionable as malevolent discrimination.244  He began 
his Grutter opinion with an excerpt from Frederick Douglass’s impassioned 
1865 speech, “What the Black Man Wants,” which he followed by stating 
that “[l]ike Douglass, I believe blacks can achieve in every avenue of 
American life without the meddling of university administrators.”245  He 
blasted the “aestheticists” who perform “their social experiments on other 
people’s children” and who lure minorities in to situations in which failure 
is inevitable.246 
In Parents Involved, he equated the position Justice Breyer and other 
dissenters took to that of the bigots who espoused Jim Crow laws and prac-
tices in earlier eras.247  Even to a proponent of an anti-classificationist, col-
or-blind view of the Equal Protection Clause, equating Justice Breyer to the 
Orville Faubuses of the world is extreme and inconsistent with the civil dis-
course Justice Thomas has championed on other occasions.248 
In his concurrence in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, Justice 
Thomas again drew a moral and constitutional equivalence between affirm-
ative action and Jim Crow segregation.249  This time he accused Justice 
Ginsburg of harboring “the benighted notion that it is possible to tell when 
discrimination helps, rather than hurts, racial minorities,”250 suggested that 
history counsels “greater humility,”251 and likened the position the Univer-
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sity of Texas and Justice Ginsburg espoused to arguments of slave owners 
and segregationists.252 
These expressions make clear that issues regarding race are not ones 
Justice Thomas approaches in a detached manner.  On the contrary, his dis-
cussions in his discretionary opinions regarding race are  sometimes emo-
tional as well as analytical.  It is not surprising that the other justices almost 
never join these opinions.  They are written in a passionate and personal 
voice from which others may learn but cannot easily join. 
Justice Thomas’s 2007 memoir makes clear his intense interest in, and 
strong views about, racial policy and provides possible insights into some 
sources of some of the opinions he has expressed in these cases.253  In the 
preface, he said that writing the book forced him “to suffer old hurts, endure 
old pains, and revisit old doubts” and that he was sometimes “surprised by 
how fresh my feelings still were.”254  Although the book did not specify 
which hurts, pains, and doubts then remained fresh, it discussed the evolu-
tion of his thinking on some matters he has addressed on the Court. For in-
stance, he recalls concluding while a student at Holy Cross in the 1960s that 
preferential policies should be available only for poorer blacks and whites 
rather than for middle-class blacks.255  But he also did not believe govern-
ment should increase the dependency of poorer blacks on government, a 
condition he thought potentially “as diabolical as segregation.”256  In apply-
ing to Yale Law School, he asked it to consider him as “disadvantaged” and 
assumed he received an admission preference based on poverty, not race.257  
But he soon suffered from the perception that his race accounted for his 
presence at the nation’s most elite law school, and he concluded that “the 
stigmatizing effects of racial preference” would subsequently discount his 
achievements.258  He felt “tricked” and hurt by his purported benefactors 
and was “even more bitter toward those ostensibly unprejudiced whites who 
pretended to side with black people while using them to further their own 
political and social ends” than towards white bigots.259  He was “humiliat-
ed” by his difficulty finding an appealing job, which he attributed to the fact 
that race preference tainted his Yale degree.260 
He strongly opposed efforts to use busing to integrate schools in the 
1970s, preferring to focus on stopping officially supported segregation and 
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on promoting education and employment.261  He thought blacks were vic-
timized by social engineering theories.262  His work in the legislative and 
executive branches confirmed his views regarding the fallacy of trying to 
send blacks to predominantly white schools rather than focusing on their 
education in their neighborhoods or at historically black institutions.263  He 
feared that policies like urban renewal would have unintended consequenc-
es harmful to minorities.264  He especially wanted to preserve historically 
black colleges from disappearing “in the rush toward integration” and was 
appalled by the indifference of government bureaucrats and civil rights 
groups who cared only about the racial composition of white colleges rather 
than educating black students.265 
The personal recitals in Justice Thomas’s memoir connect to the pas-
sionate opinions he writes regarding constitutional issues dealing with race.  
The sentiments expressed in Fordice regarding the value of historical black 
colleges will not surprise anyone who has read similar observations in the 
memoir.  Similarly, Justice Thomas’s belief that race conscious deci-
sionmaking stigmatized him and diminished his life’s accomplishments re-
sembles arguments he made in Grutter and Fisher.266 
A final facet of Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence in constitutional race 
cases provides further reason to believe that his race jurisprudence traces to 
something other than a consistent legal principle, originalist or otherwise.  
Although Justice Thomas often states principles in race cases in a formalis-
tic, rule-like manner that allows few, if any, exceptions (for example, color-
blind Constitution, no classifications based on race, and so on),267 he occa-
sionally deviates from those assertions. 
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During his first term on the Court, he twice expressed views in a man-
ner that suggested some race-conscious decisionmaking.  In Georgia v. 
McCollum, he criticized the Court’s extension of the Batson line of cases 
regarding peremptory jury challenges, noting the impact on black defend-
ants in criminal cases.  In Fordice, he wrote a concurrence stating  that the 
Court’s opinion did not jeopardize historic black schools.  To be sure, in 
each instance, he expressed some racial neutrality.  In McCollum, he opined 
that the rule barring white criminal defendants from racially based peremp-
tories would also apply to black defendants;268 in Fordice, he acknowledged 
that such historically black schools would need to use race neutral admis-
sions policies.269  But in McCollum he made clear his concern that white ju-
ries would be prejudiced against black defendants,270 and he asserted in 
Fordice that states could maintain diverse institutions including historically 
black colleges with “established traditions and programs that might dispro-
portionately appeal to one race or another.”271 
Two years after embracing a near bright-line constitutional principle 
against racial classifications in Grutter and Gratz and two years before do-
ing so in Parents Involved, Justice Thomas concluded that strict scrutiny 
did not apply when California prison officials separated inmates based on 
race.  In Johnson v. California,272 he criticized the majority for “decid[ing] 
this case without addressing the problems that racial violence poses for 
wardens, guards, and inmates throughout the federal and state prison sys-
tems.”273  Justice Thomas observed that “[t]he Constitution has always de-
manded less within the prison walls” and called for deference to “reasona-
ble judgments of officials experienced in running this Nation’s prisons.”274  
He concluded that California’s policy of race-conscious assignments was 
“reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest,”275 the test he ap-
plied from the Court’s precedent in Turner v. Safley.276  Significantly, Jus-
tice Thomas did not conclude that the strict scrutiny standard was met but 
rather that it did not apply in this context.277  He also never bothered to con-
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sider whether Turner correctly reflected the original meaning of the Consti-
tution.  Instead, Justice Thomas repeatedly invoked Turner and other prece-
dents to argue that “constitutional demands are diminished in the unique 
context of prisons” so that the Court’s strict scrutiny jurisprudence does not 
apply to racial classifications there.278 
In these opinions, Justice Thomas deviated from his usual conclusion 
that the Constitution forbids all race classifications and requires color-blind 
decisionmaking to recognize the validity of some race conscious official 
behavior.  In McCollum, the perils to black defendants prompted his com-
ment.  In Fordice, the historic role and continuing value of black institu-
tions of higher education invited his discussion.  In Johnson, the reality of 
racial violence in prisons prompted his approach.279  These cases suggest 
that notwithstanding Justice Thomas’s tendency to assert sweeping bright-
line, neutral-sounding rules regarding constitutional meaning in race cases, 
in applying his jurisprudence these propositions sometimes yield to other 
considerations.  In fact, he seems most likely to invoke this formalistic rea-
soning to strike down race-conscious governmental action that he believes 
may stigmatize African-Americans.  When he does not perceive that risk, 
he is sometimes willing to allow some race-conscious decisionmaking in 
order to pursue racial justice (for example, in McCollum and Fordice) or 
other important ends (for example, in Johnson). 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Justice Thomas’s  commitment to originalism should lead the Court’s 
most consistent originalist to use that approach in constitutional cases deal-
ing with race.  Yet for more than two decades Justice Thomas has aban-
doned that methodology in race cases even though he has often written dis-
cretionary opinions where he was free to apply his preferred approach.  
Fisher recently presented yet another occasion when, consistent with his 
longstanding practice, Justice Thomas ignored the opportunity to apply 
originalism to race-conscious decisionmaking.  Although he occasionally 
includes a reference to the Declaration of Independence, he has for more 
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than two decades made no effort in his opinions to connect the conclusions 
that the Constitution is color-blind and allows no racial classifications to 
any discussion of originalism.  Although he makes elaborate use of diction-
aries and Framers’ debates and contemporary practice in so many of his 
opinions interpreting other constitutional clauses, those originalist tools are 
absent when he addresses constitutional questions dealing with race.  In-
stead, he uses moral and consequential arguments to support his conclu-
sions in these cases, often in very passionate and personal terms. 
Justice Thomas’s judicial behavior in this respect should be a source of 
some concern to originalists.  For what does it say about a theory if its most 
prominent proponent persistently abandons it without explanation in cases 
that are clearly important to him and to the nation? 
This phenomenon also raises questions about Justice Thomas’s per-
formance based on the criteria he has set for himself.  Justice Thomas has 
repeatedly described himself as an originalist and has disparaged other 
methodologies.  Justice Thomas’s writings, on and off the Court, suggest 
that cases dealing with race and affirmative action are among those that 
most engage him, intellectually and emotionally.  Yet he has not used his 
endorsed methodology in addressing these cases nor has he provided any 
explanation for his failure to do so.  At worst, he has reached results in high 
profile race cases contrary to originalism.  At best, he has not provided an 
elaborated originalist rationale for his conclusions despite repeated oppor-
tunity to do so. 
Moreover, he has consistently failed to address extensive originalist 
arguments that contradict his conclusion.  Although he cited Professor 
McConnell’s article when it was just off the press, he has never bothered to 
discuss the work that argued that originalism leads to different results than 
those he has reached. 
Yet Justice Thomas’s work in race cases is unique.  In cases that do 
not ostensibly deal with race, he has brought racial history or impacts into 
the discussion.  In cases dealing with race, his opinions are impassioned and 
quite different from those of the other justices, even those who arrive at 
similar conclusions.  They could not, or would not, have been written by 
Justice Scalia or by any of the other conservative justices.  Others rarely 
even join Justice Thomas’s opinions in race cases.  His voice is personal 
and unique. 
This presents an irony regarding Justice Thomas’s stated aspirations to 
function as an impartial justice.  What is distinctive about his opinions in 
race cases is neither their consistency with originalism nor their impartiali-
ty.  Rather, their distinctive and powerful component resides in the unique 
perspectives Justice Thomas offers based on his experiences and observa-
tions.  These perspectives, not originalist analysis, are what he has contrib-
uted to our jurisprudence on race.  Far from the impartial umpire he asserts 
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a justice should be, in race cases his experiences and passion regarding the 
subject seem to influence his consideration of constitutional questions. 
Elsewhere, Justice Thomas may  apply insights from originalism to re-
solve constitutional disputes.  In race cases, however, he does not call them 
as the Framers or ratifiers or original generation saw them.  Nor does he ap-
pear to search for guidance in these cases from these sources regarding how 
he should see them. 
Instead, in constitutional cases dealing with race, he calls them as he 
sees them. 
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